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This study utilizes farm yield data to generate the relationship between farm and 
county yields, and farm and crop reporting district (CRD) yields by using seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR). The relationships are used to examine whether CRD level 
insurance is a viable alternative for county level Group Risk Plan (GRP) or Group Risk 
Insurance Protection (GRIP)  by generating the certainty equivalent for each producer 
under different insurance scenarios, which includes no insurance, county level insurance 
and CRD level insurance under different scales and risk aversion coefficient levels. The 
analysis is conducted for Iowa CRD 10, Ohio CRD 10, Georgia CRD 70, Mississippi 
CRD 40, and Kansas CRD 30. 
This study also analyzes how well deep loss and shallow loss programs perform 
in different production regions by looking at the marginal certainty equivalent effects. 










This work became possible because of by the support of some key persons. First, I 
am very grateful to my major professor Dr. Barry Barnett during the whole course of this 
dissertation for his concept, support, guidance and incredible assistance. Likewise, I 
would like to express my profound gratitude to my committee member Dr. Keith Coble 
and Dr. Ardian Harri for their constructive suggestions in every endeavor of my work. 
Special thanks to all of my graduate colleagues and friends for their support. Last 
but not the least, I wish to express my love and gratitude to my beloved parents for their 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... xii 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................1 
1.1  Federal Crop Insurance ..........................................................................1 
1.2  Federal Farm Programs ..........................................................................5 
1.2.1  “Shallow Loss” Program ..................................................................6 
1.2.2  “Deep Loss” Program ......................................................................7 
1.3  Problem Statement .................................................................................8 
1.4  Objectives ..............................................................................................9 
1.5  Contribution to the Literature ..............................................................10 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................11 
2.1  Crop Insurance Programs .....................................................................11 
2.1.1  Unit Level Insurance ......................................................................12 
2.1.2  Area-Based Insurance ....................................................................12 
2.2  Deep Loss Program ..............................................................................16 
2.3  Developing a Simulation Model ..........................................................17 
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................20 
3.1  Revenue, Net Revenue, and Wealth ....................................................20 
3.2  Expected Utility Model ........................................................................22 
3.3  Risk Aversion, Risk Neutral, and Risk Loving....................................24 
3.4  Absolute Risk Aversion, Constant Risk Aversion, and Relative 
Risk Aversion.......................................................................................25 
3.5  Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) Utility Function ................27 
IV. DATA AND METHODS ................................................................................30 
 
v 
4.1  Yield Data ............................................................................................30 
4.1.1  Detrending Yield Data ...................................................................31 
4.2  Price Data .............................................................................................33 
4.3  Log-Normal Distribution for Price and Beta Distribution for 
Yield .....................................................................................................33 
4.4  Estimation of Yield Data .....................................................................34 
4.5  Simulation of Correlated Price and Yield Data ...................................35 
4.5.1  Net Revenues for the GRP/GRIP under Different Insurance 
Scenarios ........................................................................................35 
4.5.2  Net Revenues for the Shallow Loss Program under 
Different Insurance Scenarios ........................................................38 
4.5.3  Net Revenues for the Deep Loss Program under Different 
Insurance Scenarios .......................................................................39 
4.5.4  Utility and Certainty Equivalent for GRP/GRIP, Shallow 
Loss Program, and Deep Loss Program .........................................41 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS ....................................................................42 
5.1  County-Level GRP/GRIP Program and CRD-Level GRP/GRIP 
Program ................................................................................................42 
5.1.1  Compare the Effectiveness of CRD-Level GRP/GRIP to 
County-Level GRP .........................................................................42 
5.1.2  Compare the Effectiveness of CRD-Level/County-Level 
GRP/GRIP under Different Scales .................................................47 
5.1.3  Compare the Effectiveness of CRD-Level/County-Level 
GRP/GRIP under Different Risk Aversion Coefficients ...............48 
5.2  Shallow Loss Program and Revenue Protection ..................................48 
5.2.1  Shallow Loss Program and Revenue Protection Results ...............49 
5.2.2  Compare the Marginal Effects of Shallow Loss Program to 
Revenue Protection within Each Location and Crop .....................51 
5.3  Deep Loss Program and Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance ..............................................................................................51 
5.3.1  Deep Loss Program and Wrapped Revenue Protection .................52 
5.3.2  The Deep Loss Program and Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance Perform Differently Across Different Locations 
and Crops .......................................................................................53 





LIST OF TABLES 
 5.1  Estimation of i  ..............................................................................................54 
 5.2  The mean of i , c , and i c   .........................................................................55 
 5.3  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .................56 
 5.4  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 .................56 
 5.5  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .................57 
 5.6  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 .................57 
 5.7  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 ..........58 
 5.8  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 3.0 ..........58 
 5.9  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 ..........59 
 5.10  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 3.0 ..........59 
 5.11  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ..........60 
 5.12  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 ..........60 
 5.13  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ..........61 
 5.14  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 ..........61 
 
vii 
 5.15  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .................62 
 5.16  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 .................62 
 5.17  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .................63 
 5.18  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 .................63 
 5.19  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ..........64 
 5.20  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 ..........64 
 5.21  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ..........65 
 5.22  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 ..........65 
 5.23  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 ...........66 
 5.24  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 3.0 ...........66 
 5.25  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 ...........67 
 5.26  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 3.0 ...........67 
 5.27  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 
2.0.....................................................................................................................68 
 5.28  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 
3.0.....................................................................................................................68 
 5.29  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 




 5.30  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 
3.0.....................................................................................................................69 
 5.31  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Mississippi Soybean CRD 40, 
CRRA 2.0 .........................................................................................................70 
 5.32  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Mississippi Soybean CRD 40, 
CRRA 3.0 .........................................................................................................70 
 5.33  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Mississippi Soybean CRD 40, 
CRRA 2.0 .........................................................................................................71 
 5.34  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance 
Scenarios at 90% coverage level, Mississippi Soybean CRD 40, 
CRRA 3.0 .........................................................................................................71 
 5.35  Percentage of Farms with Specific Results for GRP .......................................72 
 5.36  Percentage of Farms with Specific Results for GRIP ......................................72 
 5.37  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 
2.0.....................................................................................................................73 
 5.38  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 
3.0.....................................................................................................................73 
 5.39  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, 
CRRA 2.0 .........................................................................................................74 
 5.40  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 




 5.41  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, 
CRRA 2.0 .........................................................................................................75 
 5.42  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, 
CRRA 3.0 .........................................................................................................75 
 5.43  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 
2.0.....................................................................................................................76 
 5.44  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 
3.0.....................................................................................................................76 
 5.45  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, 
CRRA 2.0 .........................................................................................................77 
 5.46  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, 
CRRA 3.0 .........................................................................................................77 
 5.47  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Mississippi Cotton CRD 
40, CRRA 2.0 ...................................................................................................78 
 5.48  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Mississippi Cotton CRD 
40, CRRA 3.0 ...................................................................................................78 
 5.49  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Mississippi Soybeans CRD 
40, CRRA 2.0 ...................................................................................................79 
 
x 
 5.50  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Mississippi Soybeans CRD 
40, CRRA 3.0 ...................................................................................................79 
 5.51  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, 
CRRA 2.0 .........................................................................................................80 
 5.52  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and 
Shallow Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided 
by No Government Insurance respectively, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, 
CRRA 3.0 .........................................................................................................80 
 5.53  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .......................................................................81 
 5.54  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 .......................................................................81 
 5.55  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 ................................................................82 
 5.56  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 3.0 ................................................................82 
 5.57  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ................................................................83 
 5.58  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 ................................................................83 
 5.59  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .......................................................................84 
 5.60  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 .......................................................................84 
 
xi 
 5.61  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ................................................................85 
 5.62  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 ................................................................85 
 5.63  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 ..........................................................86 
 5.64  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 3.0 ..........................................................86 
 5.65  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Mississippi Soybeans CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 ......................................................87 
 5.66  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Mississippi Soybeans CRD 40, CRRA 3.0 ......................................................87 
 5.67  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 .................................................................88 
 5.68  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 3.1  Expected Utility Model ....................................................................................29 
 3.2  Risk Behavior of an Individual ........................................................................29 
 5.1  Corn i ’s Iowa CRD 10 ...................................................................................89 
 5.2  Cotton i ’s Georgia CRD 70 ...........................................................................89 
 5.3  Soybeans i ’s Iowa CRD 10 ...........................................................................90 
 5.4  Corn i ’s Ohio CRD 10 ...................................................................................90 
 5.5  Soybeans i ’s Ohio CRD 10 ...........................................................................91 
 5.6  Wheat i ’s Kansas CRD 30 .............................................................................91 
 5.7  Cotton i ’s Mississippi CRD 40 ......................................................................92 
 5.8  Soybeans i ’s Mississippi CRD 40 .................................................................92 
 5.9  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP CRD-level Insurance with 
Scale 1.5 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with 
no insurance, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .................................................93 
 5.10  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP CRD-level Insurance with 
Scale 1.0 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with 
no insurance, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .................................................93 
 5.11  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP County-level Insurance with 
Scale 1.5 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with 
no insurance, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .................................................94 
 5.12  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP County-level Insurance with 
Scale 1.0 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with 
no insurance, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .................................................94 
 
xiii 
 5.13  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP CRD-level Insurance with 
Scale 1.5 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with 
no insurance, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 .........................................95 
 5.14  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP CRD-level Insurance with 
Scale 1.0 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with 
no insurance, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 .........................................95 
 5.15  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP County-level Insurance with 
Scale 1.5 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with 
no insurance, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 .........................................96 
 5.16  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP County-level Insurance with 
Scale 1.0 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with 
no insurance, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 .........................................96 
 5.17  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No 
Insurance in Shallow Loss Program, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ............97 
 5.18  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No 
Insurance in Shallow Loss Program, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 
2.0.....................................................................................................................97 
 5.19  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No 
Insurance in Shallow Loss Program, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 
2.0.....................................................................................................................98 
 5.20  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No 
Insurance in Shallow Loss Program, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 
2.0.....................................................................................................................98 
 5.21  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No 
Insurance in Shallow Loss Program, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ............99 
 5.22  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No 
Insurance in Shallow Loss Program, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 
2.0.....................................................................................................................99 
 5.23  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No 
Insurance in Shallow Loss Program, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, 
CRRA 2.0 .......................................................................................................100 
 5.24  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No 




 5.25  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss 
Program, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ......................................................101 
 5.26  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss 
Program, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 ..............................................101 
 5.27  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss 
Program, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ..............................................102 
 5.28  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss 
Program, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ..............................................102 
 5.29  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss 
Program, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ......................................................103 
 5.30  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss 
Program, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 ................................................103 
 5.31  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss 
Program, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 ........................................104 
 5.32  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss 
Program, Mississippi Soybeans CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 ....................................104 
 5.33  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ...............105 
 5.34  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 .......105 
 5.35  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ........106 
 5.36  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ........106 
 5.37  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ...............107 
 
xv 
 5.38  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 .........107 
 5.39  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 
2.0...................................................................................................................108 
 5.40  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Mississippi Soybeans CRD 40, 
CRRA 2.0 .......................................................................................................108 
 5.41  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Iowa 
Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ..............................................................................109 
 5.42  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Georgia 
Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 ...........................................................................109 
 5.43  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Iowa 
Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .......................................................................110 
 5.44  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Ohio 
Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 .......................................................................110 
 5.45  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Ohio 
Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 ..............................................................................111 
 5.46  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Kansas 
Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 ............................................................................111 
 5.47  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, 
Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 ........................................................112 
 5.48  Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Insurance versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, 



























































re sold by p
 of the U.S.
es farmers’
ost of sellin








































































s than the 






coverage level from among choices that range from 50% to 85% (75% for some crops 
and regions) in 5% increments. Higher premiums are charged for higher coverage levels. 
The expected yield on an insured unit is known as the actual production history (APH) 
yield. The APH yield is calculated as a rolling average of actual yields on the insured unit 
over the previous ten years. If necessary, an initial APH yield can be established with 
fewer than ten years of yield data; however a penalty is imposed that reduces the amount 
of insurance protection per dollar of premium (Barnett, 2000). For Revenue Protection 
policies, expected revenue is calculated as the product of the APH yield and an average 
of pre-planting closing prices on the harvest futures contract. Similarly, realized revenue 
is calculated as the product of the realized yield on the insured unit and an average of 
daily harvest-time closing prices on the harvest futures contract. 
Researchers have long noted that insurance products that trigger indemnities 
based on yield or revenue losses experienced on the insured unit are subject to problems, 
such as adverse selection, moral hazard, and high administrative costs (Chambers 1989; 
Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton, 1994; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Coble et al., 1997; 
Just Calvin, and Quiggin, 1999; Skees and Barnett, 1999; Barnett, 2000). Adverse 
selection means that those who are more likely to suffer an insured loss, or those who are 
more likely to suffer larger losses, will be more willing to insure at a given premium rate. 
Moral hazard occurs when producers, after purchasing insurance, alter their production 
practices in a manner that increases either their chances of collecting an indemnity or the 
magnitude of the indemnity collected. Administrative costs are particularly high for 
insurance products that trigger indemnities based on yield or revenue shortfalls 
 
3 
experienced on the insured unit due to the need for verification of actual protection 
histories and on-farm claims adjusting. 
In an effort to address these problems, the FCIP introduced an area-based yield 
insurance plan called Group Risk Plan (GRP) for selected crops and regions in 1993 
(Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov, 2007; Barnett et. al, 2005; Skees, Black, and Barnett, 
1997). GRP indemnities are triggered whenever the realized county average yield is less 
than the product of the county-level expected yield and a coverage level chosen by the 
insured farmer. An area-based revenue insurance program, Group Risk Insurance 
Protection (GRIP), was introduced in 1999. 
From the insurer's perspective area-based insurance products offer numerous 
advantages relative to products that trigger indemnities based on yield or revenue 
shortfalls measured on the insured unit. Generally, a longer time series of yield data is 
available for county yields than for farm yields. For this reason, insurers can more 
accurately estimate expected yields and premiums for an area-based policy than for a 
policy that triggers payments based on yield or revenue shortfalls measured on the 
insured unit. There is no reason to believe that the insured producer has better 
information than the insurer has about the probability distribution of county yields which 
reduces adverse selection problems. Furthermore, it would be impossible for a producer 
to increase an area-based insurance indemnity by changing his/her production practices. 
Therefore, the potential for moral hazard is greatly reduced under an area-based program. 
Since insurers do not need to verify historical yield histories on insured units or conduct 
on-farm claims adjustment, area-based policies also have lower transaction costs. These 
advantages generally translate into lower premium costs for insured farmers. 
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The primary limitation of area-based insurance products such as GRP and GRIP is 
that it is possible for an insured farmer to suffer a large yield (revenue) shortfall on 
his/her farm, when there is no shortfall in the county yield (revenue) – or at least no 
shortfall large enough to trigger an indemnity on the area-based insurance product. 
Conversely, an insured farmer may not suffer a yield (revenue) shortfall in a year when 
many other farmers in the county do experience losses. In this case, an area-based 
insurance product may pay an indemnity even though the insured farmer has experienced 
no loss. This lack of perfect correlation between farm yields (revenue) and county yields 
(revenue) is called basis risk. Because of basis risk, GRP and GRIP policies are best 
suited to protect against widespread causes of yield loss such as drought.1 
U.S. farmers have not been enthusiastic about either GRP or GRIP. In 2011, these 
area-based policies accounted for only 4.7％of total FCIP liability (Risk Management 
Agency, 2012). Overwhelmingly, farmers seem to prefer insurance products that pay 
indemnities based on yield or revenue shortfalls measured on the insured unit. This may 
be due to concerns about basis risk with area-based insurance products. It may also 
reflect farmers’ recognition that they can receive more federal premium subsidies by 
selecting one of the more expensive unit-level insurance products. 
                                                 
1 For both GRP and GRIP, basis risk is largely a function of differences between the 
realized yield on the farm and the reported county average yield. Spatial differences in 
price do not impact GRIP basis risk because futures market prices are used to establish 
both the revenue guarantee and the realized revenue. 
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1.2 Federal Farm Programs 
U.S. federal farm programs have their roots in the New Deal era (Schertz and 
Doering, 1999; Paarlberg and  Paarlberg, 1999). The agricultural economy was extremely 
bad because of the Great Depression in 1920-1921 while agricultural prices collapsed 
around the entire world in the late 1920s. The U.S. government entered the market 
directly and tried to purchase commodities to raise their prices. However, this method 
failed in the end, because farmers grew even more crops to sell at the higher price. In 
order to address this problem, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) was adopted in 
1933 to set prices and control supply. 
Federal farm programs have changed considerably since 1933 but until recently, 
they have always focused on protecting producers from price risk. Crop insurance was 
available to help protect producers from production risks (e.g. insects, disease, and bad 
weather). So two separate programs existed to protect against two different risks. 
This changed in 1996 when the early versions of the Revenue Protection Product 
were first offered. Also, in 2008 an area-revenue triggered federal farm program called 
the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program was introduced (Barnett and Coble, 
2011). ACRE helped farmers manage their revenue risk and also protect against losses 
from multi-year price declines (Shields and Schnepf, 2011). ACRE payments are 
triggered based on two conditions: first, state-level revenue must fall below the critical 
state-level revenue and second, actual crop revenue on the individual farm much fall 
below the critical farm-level revenue. 
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Thus, the historical distinction between federal farm programs focused on price 
risk and federal crop insurance focused on yield risk no longer exists. Both federal farm 
programs and federal crop insurance now offer protection against revenue risk. 
1.2.1 “Shallow Loss” Program 
Late in 2011, the leaders of the Congressional agricultural committees decided to 
bypass the typical committee debate and markup process and instead submit a new farm 
program authorizing legislation to be included in the language being developed by the 
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (aka, the “Super Committee”). The Super 
Committee proposal was to be exempt from amendment on the floor, thus ensuring that 
the new farm program legislation would reflect the views and priorities of agricultural 
committee leaders from each chamber. These efforts did not materialize when the Super 
Committee failed to reach an agreement. Thus, the process of drafting new farm program 
authorizing legislation began again early in 2012. 
The legislation developed for the Super Committee process was the starting point 
for the 2012 farm program debates. The idea behind that legislation was to protect against 
so-called “shallow losses” which are the losses within a crop insurance deductible. 
Payments would be triggered by a small revenue shortfall (e.g., 5%) but would be 
provided for only a specified layer (e.g., between 10% and 25%) of loss. This layer of 
loss is typically borne by the producer because it falls within the range of federal crop 
insurance deductibles. Many of the “shallow loss” proposals were based on area-revenue 
designs with payments being triggered by shortfalls in revenue measured at the level of a 
county or crop reporting district (CRD). Therefore, the language that was eventually 
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forwarded to the Super Committee would have triggered payments based on revenue 
shortfalls measured at the farm level. 
1.2.2 “Deep Loss” Program 
Subsequent to the failure of the Super Committee process, at least one new 
proposal for the 2012 farm bill was put forward. This proposal from the American Farm 
Bureau Federation (AFBF) was originally called the Systemic Risk Reduction Program 
(SRRP) though the AFBF has indicated that they will likely change the name. In a recent 
article, American Farm Bureau president Bob Stallman referred to it simply as a “Deep 
Loss” program (Bennett, 2012). The deep loss proposal essentially turns shallow loss 
proposals upside down. Instead of protecting against shallow losses, it focuses on 
protecting against deep losses. Its aim is to protect against multi-year price declines but 
not shallow losses. The deep loss proposal would trigger payments whenever large losses 
occur in area-based (county or CRD) revenue measures. Similar to the GRIP area revenue 
insurance policies currently offered under the federal crop insurance program, the deep 
loss proposal would make payments to producers whenever the realized area-based 
revenue is less than some specified percentage of the expected area-based revenue. For 
example, if the expected area (county or CRD) revenue was $500 per acre and the 
coverage level was set at 70%, then producers in that area would receive a payment 
whenever the realized area-level revenue was less than the trigger revenue of $350 per 
acre; irrespective of the realized revenue on the producer’s farm. Furthermore, the 
payments would not be limited to a specified layer of revenue shortfalls. Instead, 
payments would be made for losses of any magnitude relative to the trigger level. It 
would differ from GRIP, though, by using three-year or five-year price averages instead 
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of planting prices to establish the revenue guarantee. This would help protect against 
multi-year price declines. 
With area-based crop revenue insurance and the likelihood of a new area revenue-
triggered federal farm program a question being raised is whether these two programs are 
duplicative or can be made to complement each other? To address this concern some have 
suggested “wrapping” farm-level insurance around an area revenue-triggered federal 
farm program (Paulson and Babcock, 2008). With this wrapped insurance product, on one 
hand, the area revenue-triggered farm program would provide protection against systemic 
risk, such as the big disasters, on the other hand, the farm-level insurance would protect 
against idiosyncratic risks. 
Producers could purchase farm-level federal crop insurance policies that wrap 
around the deep loss protection. For the wrap-around crop insurance policy any 
indemnity paid would be reduced by the amount the producer received from the deep loss 
program. In principal, this would reduce the premium cost of federal crop insurance 
protection because the Federal deep loss program would provide coverage against deep 
losses (Coble and Barnett, 2008). 
1.3 Problem Statement 
County yield data generated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National 
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) are used to establish both the expected yields and 
realized yields for GRP and GRIP policies. NASS county yield data would also be used 
for both the proposed shallow loss and deep loss farm programs. NASS also generates 
crop reporting district (CRD), state, and national yield estimates. A CRD consists of 
multiple counties located in a particular region of the state. Recently, NASS has reduced 
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the number of counties for which they report county yield data though yield data continue 
to be reported at the CRD, state, and national levels. As a result, RMA has had to reduce 
the number of counties in which GRP and GRIP policies are offered. 
The reduced availability of NASS county yield data motivates the research 
presented here. This study compares the effectiveness of county- and CRD-level area-
revenue insurance and farm program designs for corn and soybeans produced in Iowa 
crop reporting district 10, cotton and soybeans produced in Mississippi crop reporting 
district 40, corn and wheat produced in Kansas crop reporting district 40, cotton produced 
in Georgia crop reporting district 70 and corn and soybeans produced in Ohio crop 
reporting district 10. 
1.4 Objectives 
The general objective of this research is to see whether crop reporting district 
(CRD)-level data can provide a viable alternative to county-level data for GRP, GRIP, 
and farm programs. Specific objectives are: 
(1) Compare the effectiveness of CRD-level GRP and GRIP to county-level GRP and 
GRIP; 
(2) Evaluate the effectiveness of a county-level deep loss farm program with and 
without a wrapped revenue protection policy; 




1.5 Contribution to the Literature 
This study utilized the real farm level yield data instead of the yield data of a 
single representative farm. So, it is easily to see the relationship between county and 
farms and then to see the heterogeneity of results with a county. Thus, we can see the 
distribution of i (relationship between the county yield and farm yield). Most previous 
works assume the i s of representative farms are all equal to 1. Therefore, we can see 
that whether the CRD level area insurance is a viable alternative to GRP by using the real 
farm yield data. 
This study also discusses the shallow loss program and deep loss program which 
are the major two debated farm policies for now.  Among the current literatures, only one 
existed for deep loss program and no literature talking about the shallow loss program. 
Therefore, this study shows that the marginal effect of deep loss program and also the 





This chapter reviews relevant literature on the federal crop insurance program. It 
emphasizes both unit-level insurance and area-level insurance. No prior scholarly 
literature exists for shallow loss programs and only one previous article exists for deep 
loss programs. Relevant literature related to stochastic simulation techniques is also 
reviewed. 
2.1 Crop Insurance Programs 
The US Congress first authorized Federal Crop Insurance in 1930, and the Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) was formed to carry out delivery of the crop 
insurance products in 1938 (RMA/USDA, 2008). Up to 1980, the crop insurance program 
was set up for certain major crops and specific regions of the counties. The Crop 
Insurance Act of 1980 expanded the program to many more crops and regions of the 
country and began premium subsidy provision up to 30%. Due to these actions, 
participation in the crop insurance program increased, but still it did not achieve the 
participation that Congress expected. The Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 
changed the federal crop insurance program by authorizing a new catastrophic (CAT) 
coverage level available to farmers. The premium on this level of coverage is 100% 
subsidized by the government (Glauber, 2004). In February 1999, Congress further 
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increased the premium subsidy. Therefore, the number of insured producers in crop 
insurance programs increased by 20% from 1998 to 2003 (Glauber, 2004). 
2.1.1 Unit Level Insurance 
Unit level insurance pays indemnities based on yield (revenue) shortfalls relative 
to a specified yield (revenue) guarantee on the insured unit. Unit level insurance has been 
available for some crops and regions in the United States since 1930. 
The traditional crop insurance product is a unit level yield insurance product. This 
product (currently called Yield Protection) establishes a yield guarantee based on the 
Actual Production History (APH) yield of the insured unit. The APH yield is the average 
of four to ten years of historic yields on the insured unit that are provided by the farmer.  
In 1996, two crop revenue insurance programs, Income Protection (IP) and Crop 
Revenue Coverage (CRC), were introduced in certain areas for specific crops. In 1997, 
Revenue Assurance (RA) became a third crop revenue product. These products were 
consolidated into a single Revenue Protection product in 2010. 
Revenue Protection guarantees a certain level of farm revenue rather than just 
yield, for a given crop and pays an indemnity if revenue falls beneath the guarantee. 
Revenue Protection not only deals with yield risk but also offers some protection against 
price risk. Both expected and actual prices for Revenue Protection are based on futures 
(market) prices. The prices are not the price actually received by insured farmer. 
2.1.2 Area-Based Insurance 
Unit-level insurance is free of basis risk, but suffers many problems: adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and high transaction cost. On the other hand, the area-level based 
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insurance programs like GRP and GRIP are less prone to problems of asymmetric 
information and also can reduce the transaction costs, but due to the lack of perfect 
correlation between farm yields and area yield, these area-based products are exposed to 
higher basis risk. So, reducing basis risk is an important objective when designing area 
based products (Skees, Black, and Barnett, 1997). 
Halcrow (1949) initially proposed the use of area-based insurance products in the 
United States. He argued that insuring unit-level yield insurance “will work in a 
satisfactory manner only under a system of conditions so exacting in their specification 
that they will be found useful to a rather limited extent in American agriculture” (p. 476). 
The Federal Crop Insurance Commission issued a report in 1989 calling for a 
pilot program to test the feasibility of an area yield insurance contract (Barnett, 2000). 
Barnaby and Skees (1990) demonstrated how an area yield insurance policy might work 
and its potential advantages over a unit-level insurance policy. Miranda (1991) 
formalized these insights using a framework based on the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). From a farmer’s perspective, the choice between area-based insurance and 
farm-based insurance is a trade-off between higher basis risk (with the area-based 
products) and higher premium cost (with the farm-level products). Different regions and 
different crops may have different magnitudes of basis risk.  
Skees (1992) provided the background analysis and development for the 1993 
pilot test of GRP on soybeans. In 1994, the President strongly endorsed GRP as a 
replacement for unit-level based crop insurance. In response, Congress did not eliminate 
unit-level based crop insurance, but authored GRP as an alternative crop insurance 
product for the Federal Crop Insurance Program. As a result, GRP was expanded in 1994 
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to 1,875 county-crop programs for wheat, corn, soybeans, grain sorghum, cotton, barley, 
forage, and peanuts.  
Skees, Black and Barnett (1997) documented the design; rating and 
implementation of GRP which was made available in twenty-seven States. GRP 
indemnity payments are made based on percentage shortfalls in actual county yields 
relative to a forecasted yield (Skees, Black, and Barnett, 1997). They said that in order to 
reduce basis risk, the area for an area yield contract should be selected such that it 
contains a large group of farms with similar soils and climate.  
Miranda (1991) and Smith, Chouinard, and Baquet (1994) found that the 
homogeneity of the region is a key element that can affect the effectiveness of area-based 
insurance contracts. Heterogeneity of factors such as elevation, soil type, and drainage, 
within a county (or CRD) will make unit-level yields less correlated with county (or 
CRD) yields.  
Wang et al. (1998) found that the performance of different crop insurance designs 
were related to restrictions on trigger yields, the size of premium loadings, and basis risk 
(the relationship between farm yield and area yield). They suggested that when Yield 
Protection requires a 35% premium loading, and trigger-yield restrictions are set at their 
current levels, Yield Protection is preferred to GRP. Basis risk also plays an important 
role for the performance of different designs. If basis risk is high, then the area yield 
insurance does not allow farmers to manage their risk very well. However, if the Yield 
Protection trigger yield restrictions, are eliminated GRP is preferable to Yield Protection, 
even with farm-area yield correlations as low as 0.8. Therefore, the moral hazard and 
adverse selection incentives associated with area yield index (indemnities are triggered 
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by area yield/revenue shortfalls not farm yield shortfalls) provide little economic 
justifications for the current restrictions on GRP trigger yield. 
Mahul (1999) demonstrated the optimal design of crop insurance when the 
indemnity is based on the aggregate yield of a surrounding area. He found that the 
optimal area yield crop insurance contract depends on the farm level beta coefficient that 
measures the sensitivity of the farm yield related to the area yield. 
Vercammen (2000) examined the impact of trigger yield constraints on the 
optimal design of an area yield insurance contract. With area yield crop insurance, 
indemnity is triggered if the farm yield falls below a certain level of yield which is called 
trigger yield or critical yield. This trigger yield is chosen by the producer but it is 
generally restricted (e.g., 80% of the average of area yield).Vercammen showed that the 
optimal rate of indemnification is the same with and without the constraint on trigger 
yield. 
Bourgeon and Chambers (2003) found that the asymmetric or symmetric 
information between the insurer and the farmer has a big effect on farm insurance 
contracts. When there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer, the 
full-insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection, and will not be good for the 
insurance company. Therefore, based on this situation, they have also described the 
optimal area-yield insurance contract under asymmetric information between the insurer 
and the farmer. 
Barnett et al. (2005) compare the performance of unit-level yield insurance and 
GRP contracts using farm-level yield data on 66,686 corn farms from ten states in the 
Corn Belt and 3,152 sugar beet farms from two states in the upper Midwest. Their results 
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show that the states where GRP did not perform well relative to unit-level yield insurance 
(Nebraska, Texas, and Michigan) have relatively lower correlations between farm and 
county yields. Meanwhile, GRP generated more risk reduction than unit-level yield 
insurance in many states (Illinois, Minnesota, Kentucky, Iowa, Ohio and Indiana). 
Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov (2007) used farm-level yield data and the actual 
insurance premium rates to determine the relative desirability of unit-level yield 
insurance and area-based yield insurance for heterogeneous production regions (e.g., 
South Carolina cotton and soybean, Georgia cotton production regions, etc.).They 
conclude that even in heterogeneous production regions, area yield insurance may be a 
viable alternative to unit-level insurance for many producers if premium rates for unit-
level insurance are relatively high due to previous program abuse, moral hazard, or 
adverse selection problems. 
2.2 Deep Loss Program 
Deep Loss Program is a program designed such that government takes care of the 
deep loss and producers take care of the shallow loss. Producers could purchase farm-
level federal crop insurance policies that wrap around the deep loss protection. For the 
wrap-around crop insurance policy any indemnity paid would be reduced by the amount 
the producer received from the deep loss program. Specifically, with a wrapped insurance 
product, that will be any payment received from the underlying area revenue-triggered 
commodity due on an associated farm-level revenue insurance policy. In principal, this 
would reduce the premium cost of federal crop insurance protection because the Federal 
deep loss program would provide coverage against deep losses. In this case, the area 
revenue-triggered commodity program would provide protection against systemic loss 
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events (such as drought) while the farm-level policy would protect against residual, 
idiosyncratic losses (Coble and Barnett, 2008). 
2.3 Developing a Simulation Model 
Various techniques exist for multivariate simulation with correlated variables. 
Historically, multivariate simulation was most often performed by assuming multivariate 
normality. However, imposing normality on the marginal distribution of crop yields and 
prices is often not supported by empirical data (Harri et al. 2009). For many crops and 
regions, yield and price are not independent. For example, in the Midwest corn yield and 
price are generally negatively correlated (Coble and Barnett, 2008). Only by using a 
procedure capable of modeling and simulating multivariate distributions can one analyze 
such complex combinations (Ramirez, 2000).  
If outcomes depend on realizations of stochastic variables, simulation techniques 
can be used to analyze the distribution of outcomes. Monte Carlo simulation is one of the 
most popular sampling methods that can generate thousands of observations having the 
same properties as the original set of data. Monte Carlo simulation involves randomly 
sampling with replacement from a given distribution (Hardakar et al., 2004). A modeling 
challenge occurs when multiple stochastic variables simultaneously determine outcomes 
and the stochastic variables are correlated. 
The Iman and Conover (IC) (1982) procedure for risk simulation and the Phoon, 
Quek, and Huang (PQH) (2004) procedure are both widely used to maintain inherent 
correlations in multivariate stochastic simulation models in agricultural economics 
research (Mildenhall, 2005). 
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Iman and Conover (IC) (1982) present a procedure for simulating correlated 
variables from mixed marginal distributions in the multivariate simulation case. This 
procedure has become standard in actuarial practice. “The IC procedure involves 
simulating independent variables and then re-sorting them using information in the 
correlation matrix” (Anderson, Harri, and Coble, 2009: 54-65). Therefore, the IC 
procedure is computationally intensive, especially when the sample size is large. 
Although there is some ad hoc aspects of this procedure (Ferson et al., 2004), the IC 
procedure has gained wide currency due to its simplicity, and suitability to a wide variety 
of programming environments (Anderson, Harri, and Coble, 2009). 
The PQH procedure is similar to IC in that PQH is coded similar to IC. The PQH 
procedure can be applied both for mixed marginal distributions and empirical 
distributions. “Their procedure consists of simulation of correlated probabilities using 
information in the correlation matrix. These probabilities are used in an inverse 
transformation of the relevant marginal distribution to produce correlated variables from 
the simulation.” (Anderson, Harri, and Coble, 2009: 54-65). This procedure has been 
applied to the simulation of risk management strategies related to crop insurance and 
farm programs. (Anderson, Coble, and Miller, 2007 ; Ubilava et.al, 2011). 
Anderson, Harri, and Coble (2009) compared the IC and PQH simulation 
methods.  Although the IC procedure is more popular, PQH is superior in its 
straightforwardness and free of distributional assumptions. As mentioned earlier, the IC 
procedure needs to sort the data into the correlation matrix. In this case, this will cause re-
sorting the data to individual correlation matrix and then remerging to produce a final 
simulated data set. Therefore, in this aspect, the IC procedure is a much more 
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cumbersome process for programming compared to PQH procedure, which involves 
intact matrix manipulation (Anderson, Harri, and Coble, 2009). This work utilizes the 
PQH procedure because of its suitability for both parametric and nonparametric 






This chapter presents the conceptual framework used for the study. It emphasizes 
different kinds of risk behaviors, the expected utility model, and the constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility function. In addition, Miranda’s (1991) model of yield 
variability is also discussed. 
3.1 Revenue, Net Revenue, and Wealth 
Crop yield is a stochastic variable and calculated as production divided by planted 
acres. Yield risk is the variability in yields across different growing seasons. Crop yield 
risk can be affected by many factors, such as weather, insects, drought, fertilization, and 
irrigation techniques. If a widespread loss event occurs within a certain area, then the 
crop yield of that whole area will suffer a loss. This is called systematic yield risk, as 
opposed to yield risk associated with any one individual farm which is idiosyncratic risk. 
The idiosyncratic risk which is also called unsystematic risk, is the risk of yield shortfalls 
due to the unique circumstances of an individual farmer and can be reduced through 
spatial diversification. 
Building on Miranda (1991), suppose that there is a producer i, whose yield ,i ty is 
random due to the uncertainty of weather and other natural phenomena in year t. If 
producer i operates in a county where the average yield across all farms is ,c ty then: 
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Equation (3.1) decomposes the individual yield variation into two components: a 
systemic component ,( )i c t cy  , which is correlated with the area yield and a non- 
systemic component ,i t , which is uncorrelated with the area-yield and reflects 
idiosyncratic deviations in farm-yields that are not associated with the deviations in the 
area-yield. The coefficient i measures the sensitivity of the farm yield deviations from 
farm yield expectation to area yield deviations from area yield expectation. 
Crop price is also stochastic. Crop price risk is systematic risk because prices for 
the same crop are spatially correlated across the whole nation. Price and yield are random 
variables but may not be independent. Crop yield has often been found negatively 
correlated with price. In some regions and for some crops, like Iowa corn, the 
relationship between price and yield is strongly negative, which makes revenue less 
variable. So, the more negative correlation between price and yield, the lower revenue 
risk is. Yields are also correlated across different levels of aggregation, for example, farm 
yields are often correlated with the county yield. 
Producer i’s realized revenue is, 
 , ,i t t i tR p y   (3.2) 
where tp  is the price of crop in period t, and ,i tR  is the revenue in period t. 
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Insurance is a form of risk management primarily used to hedge against the risk of 
a contingent, uncertain loss. The amount to be charged for a certain amount of insurance 
coverage is called the premium. The amount of money that will be received if the insured 
individual suffers a loss is called indemnity. Because the insurance cost, the premium is 
the only cost we consider in this study, the net revenue (return) is revenue plus indemnity 
minus premium. Results are presented as ratios of insurance scenario outcomes to a no 
insurance scenario outcome. Thus, ignoring other production costs has no much impact 
on the results presented. Therefore, the ending wealth is the sum of the initial wealth and 
the net revenue of that farm. So, 
 , ,i t i t t tNR R n     (3.3) 
where tn is the indemnity of the insurance in period t; where t  is the premium of the 
insurance in period t, and ,i tNR is the net revenue in period t; 
 , 0 ,i t i tW W NR   (3.4) 
where ,i tW the ending wealth of individual is farm in period t, and 0W is the initial wealth 
of individual farm. After the calculation of wealth, the expected utility of wealth is going 
to be addressed in the following part. 
3.2 Expected Utility Model 
The expected utility hypothesis conceptualizes that decision makers make their 
decisions based on the expected utility from the gamble (Chavas, 2004). Consider the 
following hypothetical example. Assume that a given decision maker has a utility 
function defined over x ( )U x , such that there are two possible outcomes 1x and 2x  which 
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are considered as two possible ending wealth outcomes of this gamble that have the same 
probabilities of occurrence. In this case, it is assumed that the decision maker’s objective 
would be to maximize the expected utility. This concept is depicted in the Figure 3.1. In 
this figure, a gamble has   probability of obtaining 1x outcome that provides utility 
1( )U x while there is another event with a (1 ) probability to obtain 2x outcomes that 
will provide utility 2( )U x . 
The expected value of the gamble is 1 2( ) (1 )E x x x    ; the utility of the 
expected value is    1 2( ) ( ) [(1 ) ]u E x u x x    ; and the expected utility for the gamble 
is 1 2( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )E U U x U x    . While making decisions under uncertain circumstances, 
decision makers make decisions based on their expected utility rather than the utility of 
the expected outcome. 
The certainty equivalent (CE) of a risky gamble is defined as the sure amount of 
money that if received would have a utility that is equal to the expected utility of the two 
possible outcomes 1x and 2x . After the estimation of the expected utility, it can 
conveniently be converted to the monetary terms. This monetary amount is what is 
referred to as the certainty equivalent for that prospect. As shown in Figure 3.1, CE refers 
to certainty equivalent from the risky prospect. It is expected that an individual would 
take an amount that is at least equivalent to the CE to avoid playing the gamble. Different 
risk preference people have different utility function and then have different value of 
expected utility. In the following part, it will focus on different risk preference people. 
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3.3 Risk Aversion, Risk Neutral, and Risk Loving 
People who prefer certainty and dislike gambles are described as risk averse. A 
risk averse person is sometimes willing to accept a sure outcome rather than face an 
uncertain outcome with a higher expected payoff. For example, a risk-averse individual 
might choose to put his or her money into a bank account with a low but guaranteed 
interest rate, rather than into a stock that may have high expected returns, but also 
involves a chance of losing value. 
Different people have different risk preference. Some people are willing to take 
risk which means that those kinds of people would love to play with risk. This reflects a 
risk-loving behavior. For risk loving people, the utility function defined over wealth is 
convex to the origin. Convexity implies increasing marginal utility of wealth. The more 
convex the utility curves, the more risk-loving the individuals are. On the other hand, 
people who do not care about risk while making decisions are referred to as risk neutral. 
For risk neutral people, the utility function defined over wealth is a straight line that 
emanates from the origin. Risk neutrality implies constant marginal utility of wealth. 
These risk-averse individuals have a concave utility function over wealth and are willing 
to pay some amount of premium to get rid of risk. Risk aversion implies deceasing 
marginal utility of wealth. The more concave the curves are, the more risk-averse the 
individuals are. The utility function of wealth across different risk behaviors are shown in 
figure 3.2. 
A risk premium is the minimum amount of money by which the expected return 
of the risky gamble must exceed the known or the risk-free gamble in order to induce an 
individual to hold the risky gamble rather than the risk-free gamble. Only risk averse 
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individuals would be willing to pay a risk premium to avoid risk. In figure 3.1, the 
difference between expected value and the certainty equivalent is indicated by the 
horizontal arrow which is called the risk premium. The risk premium is calculated as the 
difference between the expected value of the two outcomes and the certainty equivalent, 
i.e Risk Premium = ( )E x CE . Thus it is the minimum willingness to accept 
compensation for the risk. A risk-averse decision maker’s expected utility is always 
lower than the utility of the expected outcome. Or in the other words, can be expressed as 
[ ( )] ( )U E x E U . The risk averse people will have concave utility function, but the 
concaveness depends on different risk averse utility functions. 
3.4 Absolute Risk Aversion, Constant Risk Aversion, and Relative Risk Aversion 
Thus far we have defined a risk averse person as one who would refuse to play 
fair gambles because he/she has a utility function that exhibits diminishing marginal 
utility of wealth. But some people are more risk averse than others. How can we measure 
risk aversion? Pratt (1964) proposed a method for measuring risk aversion based on the 















   (3.5) 
where ,( )i tr W is the absolute measure of risk aversion. 
Constant risk aversion means that adding a constant to all outcomes of two 
distributions, or multiplying all their outcomes by the same positive number, will not 
change the preference relation between them (Safra and Segal, 1998). People’s 
willingness to pay to avoid risky situations may be a function of their initial wealth. 
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Relative risk aversion is the product of wealth and absolute risk aversion. The 
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where ,( )i trr W indicates relative risk aversion. Let   represent the risk aversion 
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  . So, if  is greater 
than 0, the absolute risk aversion is decreasing; if  equals to 0, the absolute risk aversion 
is constant; if  is less than 0, the absolute risk aversion is increasing. Therefore, the 
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Since ,( )i trr W is not a function of ,i tW , the power function exhibits constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA). In the following part, the constant relative risk aversion utility function 
is going to be discussed, because it will be utilized in this study. 
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3.5 Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) Utility Function 
Risk averse farmers exhibit a decreasing marginal utility over the amount of pay 
off. Because the risk averse farmer would like to pay amount of money to avoid take the 
risk. This study assumes that decision makers (i.e. farmers) have relative risk aversion 
coefficients of 2.0 and 3.0. 
A certain farmer’s utility is a function of ending wealth. The ending wealth is 
determined by initial wealth and net return which varies according to the variability of 
price, yield, or the combination of both. An individual with a CRRA utility function cares 
about gains or losses in proportion to initial wealth. The CRRA utility function is a risk 
preference formulation that concerns most on the initial wealth where the downside risks 
are weighted higher than upside risks (Chavas, 2004).  
Different risk aversion coefficients reflect varying levels of risk aversion. In 
general, the lower the coefficient is, the less risk averse an individual and vice versa. A 
risk aversion coefficient of 0.5 in CRRA indicates a low level of risk aversion. A 
somewhat risk averse individual would have a CRRA risk aversion coefficient of 1, 2.0 
indicates moderately risk averse, 3.0 indicates very risk averse; and 4.0 indicates 
extremely risk averse.  According to Hardakar et al. (2004), the CRRA function has a 
problem with a 4 or higher level risk aversion coefficient which implies very high 
marginal utility for low values of wealth with a sharp fall to give essentially zero 
marginal utility for higher values. Further, a risk-aversion level above 5 is perceived to be 





The farmer’s expected utility is  
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      (3.10) 
where j is the probability that outcome j will occur. 
The certainty equivalent (CE) is the guaranteed amount of money that an 
individual would view as equally desirable as a risky asset. Alternatively, a guaranteed 
return that someone would accept, rather than taking is a chance on a higher, but 
uncertain return. So, the certainty equivalent for the power utility function is 
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The S represents for different insurance scenarios. For GRP/GRIP, it represents for no 
insurance, county level insurance, and CRD level insurance under different scales; for 
shallow loss program, it represents for no insurance, Revenue Protection, and the 
combination of Revenue Protection and shallow loss program; for deep loss program, it 
represents for no insurance, deep loss program, and the wrapped Revenue Protection 
insurance. This study will look at the ratios of each insurance scenario within one 





















DATA AND METHODS 
This chapter presents the data and methods used for the study. In particular, it 
emphasizes the different categories of yield and price data, the trend estimation methods, 
and multivariate simulation techniques used to simulate correlated yield and price data 
for further insurance examination. 
4.1 Yield Data 
Farm-level yield data were obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA). These data are the 10-year yield histories 
from 1999 to 2008 that were used to establish APH yields for 2009 purchasers of yield 
and revenue insurance policies. Both CRD and county-level yield data that span from 
1971-2010 were obtained from National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). 
This study focuses on corn and soybeans produced in Iowa crop reporting district 
(CRD) 10, cotton and soybeans produced in Mississippi CRD 40, corn and soybeans 
produced in Ohio CRD 10, wheat produced in Kansas CRD 30, and cotton produced in 
Georgia CRD 70. These CRDs were selected based on their significant production of the 
crop, complete time series of CRD NASS data for 1971-2010, and also availability of 
farm-level yield data. 
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For each crop and CRD combination, counties were eliminated that did not have 
at least twenty-five different farms with 10-year APH series for the crop. This resulted in 
eight counties being eliminated for Georgia CRD 70 cotton, one county being eliminated 
for Iowa CRD 10 corn, one county being eliminated for Mississippi CRD 40 soybeans, 
and two counties being eliminated for Mississippi CRD 40 cotton. Also, counties without 
a county yield series of 1999 to 2008 were eliminated resulting in one county being 
eliminated for Ohio CRD 10 corn and two counties being eliminated for Kansas CRD 30 
wheat. No counties were eliminated from the analysis for Iowa CRD 10 soybeans, for 
Ohio CRD 10 soybeans. 
4.1.1 Detrending Yield Data 
Technology changes over time can affect crop yields (Anderson and Hazel, 1987). 
In order to make the yield data comparable across different years, the trend inherent in 
the yield data should be taken out and adjusted to the current year 2010 yield. A linear 
trend specification of yields is used to capture the trend in crop reporting district (CRD) 
yield data for all crops (Hafner 2003, Tweeten 1998, Hazell 1984). These were estimated 
separately using 40 years of CRD-level data from 1971 to 2010. For a given crop, the 
regression model is given by: 
 , 0, 1, ,t CRD CRD CRD t CRDy tr      (4.1) 
where ,t CRDy is CRD-level yield for each crop in year tr , 1tr  for 1971, 2tr  for 
1972,…, 40tr  for 2010; 0,CRD is the intercept; 1,CRD is the trend coefficient; ,t CRD is the 
error term/residual for crop in year t . 
 
32 
Once equation (4.1) is estimated, the percentage residual can be calculated as 
  
, , ,% /t CRD t CRD t CRDy  , where 

,t CRDy  is the predicted value and 

,t CRD  is the estimated 
residual from equation (4.1). So, the detrended CRD-level yield for each crop and each 
year is equal to the product of the predicted CRD-level yield of year 2010 and the sum of 
one and the percentage residual. 
    ,,detrend 2010, (1 % )t CRDCRD CRDy y     (4.2) 
After the CRD-level yield trend estimation, the same trend parameter coefficient 
1 ,i CRD was applied to county-level yield data and farm-level yield data. Thus, the slopes 
of the yield across years are the same for farm-level, county-level, and CRD-level data.  
The trend reflects the level of technology which can be seen as systemic effect across the 
entire nation. In this case, the same trend estimator is going to be used for different yield 
aggregations. This allows us to calculate the corresponding intercepts for county-level 
and farm-level specifications respectively as, 
 1,,intercept = CRDt c cy tr   (4.3) 
where, cy is the mean of realized county-level yield across different years for each crop 
and tr is the mean of tr, 
  , 1 ,, intercept t c t CRDt cy t    (4.4) 
where  ,t cy is the predicted county-level yield. The residuals from the county-level 
specification can be calculated as, 
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  , , ,t cty t c t cy y    (4.5) 
The percentage residual of county yield can be calculated as, 
   , , ,% /t c t c t cy   (4.6) 
Thus, the county-level detrended yield can be calculated as, 
    ,, ,detrend 2010, (1 % )t ct c cy y     (4.7) 
Farm-level yield data was detrended following the same approach as in the county-level 
yield data. 
4.2 Price Data 
This study uses price data that were obtained from the Commodity Research 
Bureau (CRB). The price data spans from 1971 to 2010. The price data comprises both 
actual harvest price and futures price at the time of planting for wheat, corn, soybean, and 
cotton. The ratio of harvest price and planting price is calculated and multiplied by 
current planting price to adjust to current price and then used for the study. 
4.3 Log-Normal Distribution for Price and Beta Distribution for Yield 
The price data were fit to a log-normal distribution. Price data tends to be auto-
correlated over time and positively skewed, which is normally assumed as log-normal 
distribution. In order to fit the log-normal distribution, we first calculated ratio of 
harvesting price over planting price for period 1971-2010, and then fit the ratios into log-
normal distribution.  
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The yield data were fit to a beta distribution. Since crops yields cannot be 
negative and also the limited current agricultural technique methods, the distribution of 
yield appear negatively skewed, which can be normally assumed as beta distribution. Fit 
the detrended CRD-yield data into beta distribution for the yield series 1971-2010. 
Several studies in agricultural economics support the use of beta distribution for 
yield data and log normal distribution for price data (Roberts, Goodwin and Coble, 1998). 
Crop yields are non-negative, and the beta distribution ranges from 0 to 1, but can be 
scaled to any interval. However, one must impose or estimate the upper and lower bound 
to assume for scaling. Price is non-negative having lower bound value zero to upper 
bound positive infinitive. The marginal probability distribution and correlation matrix for 
the original data set were obtained. 
4.4 Estimation of Yield Data 
Miranda 1991’s model is going to be used for parameters’ estimation. While 
Miranda’s equation (3.1) focuses on the relationship between county-level yield 
deviations from expectation and farm-level yield deviations from expectation, the same 
logic can be extended to the relationship between county- and CRD-level yields. 
Specifically, 
  , , ,c t c c CRD t CRD c ty y        (4.6) 
where, all the terms in these equations logically have the similar definitions as in 
equation (3.1) apart from c represents for county. c  was obtained by estimating equation 
(3.1) using OLS. Further, equation (3.1) and (4.6) were simultaneously estimated using 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) with c restricted to be equal to its OLS estimated 
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values since the error terms are potentially contemporaneously correlated. This allows us 
to capture i , ,c t , and ,i t for the estimation of from the equation (3.1) and (4.6). The two 
error terms ,c t , ,i t are assumed to be normally distributed. After the i and c can be 
captured, the products of i and c can also be calculated which is the way to measure 
the relationship between farm yield and CRD yield. The relationship between farm yield 
and CRD yield has not been addressed in the current literatures. 
4.5 Simulation of Correlated Price and Yield Data 
4.5.1 Net Revenues for the GRP/GRIP under Different Insurance Scenarios 
The multivariate PQH technique was adopted to simulate both the price and yield 
data. Correlated random draws were taken from the beta distribution of CRD level yields 
and the log-normal distribution of price by using the PQH technique. This allows us to 
obtain simulated correlated price p and CRD-level yield  ,CRD ty where tilde indicates 
simulated values. Random draws of the error terms were also taken from the normal 
distribution. By substituting  ,CRD ty and 

,c t into equation (4.6), we get 
    ,, ,( ) c tc c CRDc t CRD ty y        (4.7) 
Substituting equation (4.7) into (3.1), we get 
  , , , ,i t i i c CRD t CRD c t i ty y             (4.8) 
Suppose that the GRP is denominated in production units, say, bushels per acre. 
The producer purchases the coverage at a premium of bushels per acre. The insured 
 
36 
selects a scale of between 0.9 and 1.5, and a yield coverage level (coverage) of between 
0.7 and 0.9 (the deductible equals 1- coverage). The critical yield, y is calculated as 
 *c cy coverage   (4.9) 
While not currently offered in the FCIP, it is also possible to construct GRP at a CRD 
level rather than a county level. In this case, the critical yield would be 
 *CRD CRDy coverage   (4.10) 
Insured will receive an indemnity whenever *cy y or
*
CRD CRDy y . For GRP, we set the 
non-stochastic price nsp for each crop respectively, $7.00 per bushel for corn, $11.00 per 
bushel for soybeans, $0.9 per pound for cotton, and $7 per bushel for wheat. So, for GRP 











   
   
 (4.11) 
The CRD level indemnity function is the same with county level indemnity 
function. For GRIP, net yields per acre were multiplied by a related stochastic price to 
obtain revenue per acre. Thus, the county level critical revenue is, 
 *c c pR coverage     (4.12) 
Similarly, the CRD level critical revenue is, 
 *CRD CRD pR coverage     (4.13) 
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Insurers will receive an indemnity whenever *c cR R or
*
CRD CRDR R . For GRIP policies, 











   
   
 (4.14) 
where c times scale is the insurer’s liability (the insured protection) or the maximum 
possible indemnity payment. The CRD level indemnity function is the same with county 
level indemnity function. 
For simplicity, subscript t  is dropped. Farm i’s net revenue without purchasing 
insurance in a given year can be calculated as: 
 ,
net
i NI iR y p   (4.15) 
where NI indicates that producers do not buy insurance. 
Farm i’s net revenue from purchasing area revenue insurance based on county-
level revenue is 
 , ,
net net
i c i NI c cR R n     (4.16) 
We can obtain farm i’s net revenue from purchasing area revenue insurance based 
on CRD-level revenue by replacing equation (4.16) with the corresponding CRD 
parameters. Similar calculations would hold if the area revenue insurance were based on 
CRD-level revenue rather than county-level revenue. We assume the premium is 
actuarially fair, that is, it is equal to the expected indemnity [ ]cE n . We assume actuarially 
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fair premium instead of including the subsidy because we want to analyze the insurance 
from risk management perspective. 
4.5.2 Net Revenues for the Shallow Loss Program under Different Insurance 
Scenarios 
For the shallow loss program, we use revenue instead of just using yields; and 
also, the price data is the same as for GRP/GRIP, instead of using the average 3-5 years 
data.  In this case, the producers buy the farm level insurance which is called Revenue 
Protection up to 75%, and then sign a contract with government to get county-level 
revenue insurance with coverage 90% for free. Therefore, for shallow loss program the 
scale is equal to 1.0; the coverage is 90% down to the layer of 75%. So the critical 
revenue for GRIP in shallow loss program is, 
 * 0.9c c pR      (4.17) 
In shallow loss program, the GRIP indemnity is, 
  *max[( ),0]GRIP c cn R R   (4.18) 
The shallow loss indemnity function is, 
  min[ , (15% )]sl GRIP c pn n      (4.19) 
The critical revenue for Revenue Protection is, 
 * 0.75i i pR      (4.20) 
The indemnity function for Revenue Protection is, 
  *, max[( ),0]RP sl i in R R   (4.21) 
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We assume the premium is actually fair for Revenue Protection that is expected 
indemnity equals to premium, but the premium for shallow loss program is zero because 
government pays for it. So, farm i’s net revenue from having only shallow loss program 
based on county-level revenue is, 
 , ,
net net
i sl i NI slR R n   (4.22) 
Farm i’s net revenue from purchasing only Revenue Protection is, 
 , ,
net net
i RP i NI RP RPR R n     (4.23) 
Farm i’s net revenue from having both shallow loss program and Revenue Protection is, 
  , , ( )
net net
i both i NI sl RP RPR R n n      (4.24) 
4.5.3 Net Revenues for the Deep Loss Program under Different Insurance 
Scenarios 
For the deep loss program, we use revenue instead of just using yields; and also, 
the price data is the same as for GRP/GRIP, instead of using the average 3-5 years data. 
Producers could purchase Revenue Protection with coverage 85% that wrap around the 
deep loss program with coverage 70%. In current policies, scale is not being considered. 
So in general, it can be assumed equal to 1.0 in deep loss program. So the critical revenue 
for deep loss protection is, 
 * 0.7c c pR      (4.25) 
The indemnity for deep loss protection is, 
  *max[( ),0]deep c cn R R   (4.26) 
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The premium is equal to zero for deep loss program because government needs to pay for 
it. The critical revenue for Revenue Protection in deep loss program is, 
 * 0.85i i pR      (4.27) 
The indemnity for Revenue Protection in deep loss program is, 
  *max[( ),0]RP i in R R   (4.28) 
Because the producers purchase the Revenue Protection wrapped around the GRIP (deep 
loss), so the indemnity for both taking deep loss program and Revenue Protection which 
is called wrapped Revenue Protection insurance products is, 
   max[ , ]wrap deep RPn n n  (4.29) 
For the wrap-around crop insurance policy any indemnity paid would be reduced 
by the amount the producer received from the deep loss program. Therefore, the premium 
for taking the wrapped Revenue Protection insurance products should be, 
  {max[( ),0]}RP deepwrap E n n    (4.30) 




i deep i NI deepR R n   (4.31) 




i wrap i NI wrap wrapR R n     (4.32) 
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4.5.4 Utility and Certainty Equivalent for GRP/GRIP, Shallow Loss Program, 
and Deep Loss Program 
Each farm is assumed to consist of 1,000 acres of the crop so simulated total 
revenue was equal to simulated revenue per acre times 1,000. An initial wealth equal to 
10% of the CRD-level expected revenue per acre for the crop times 1,000 acres was 
assumed for every farm in the CRD. For each farm, ending wealth ,
net
i SW  under each 
scenario was calculated as initial wealth plus the simulated total revenue. Assuming a 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, utility was calculated as 















where s indicates the insurance scenario (no insurance, county area revenue insurance, or 
CRD area revenue insurance), and 1  is the measure of relative risk aversion. Expected 
utility across the 10,000 iterations is calculated as 
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where j  is the probability that outcome j will occur. The certainty equivalent (CE) is 
calculated as 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This chapter will compare the effectiveness of CRD-level GRP and GRIP to 
county-level GRP and GRIP, compare the effectiveness of shallow loss farm program 
across different locations and crops, and compare the effectiveness of a deep loss farm 
program across different locations and crops. 
5.1 County-Level GRP/GRIP Program and CRD-Level GRP/GRIP Program 
Each type of insurance (county-level and CRD-level) was analyzed at scale = 1.00 
and scale = 1.50. Coverage was assumed to be equal to 90% which is the maximum 
coverage currently available for GRP and GRIP. For each scenario, it was further 
assumed that 2  and 3  . 
5.1.1 Compare the Effectiveness of CRD-Level GRP/GRIP to County-Level GRP 
Histograms of i (the relationship between the farm yield and county yield) are 
presented in figures 5.1-5.8 for Iowa CRD 10 corn, Georgia CRD 70 cotton, Iowa CRD 
10 soybeans, Ohio CRD 10 corn, Ohio CRD 10 soybean, Kansas CRD 30 wheat, 
Mississippi CRD 40 cotton, and Mississippi CRD 40 soybeans, respectively. In each 
figure, the x-axis represents the value of i , and the y-axis represents the frequency of 
occurrence in percentages.  Specifically, in figure 5.1, 26% of the i s are between 1.00 
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and 1.25. Compare Iowa CRD 10 corn (figure 5.1) and Georgia CRD 70 cotton (figure 
5.2). The distribution of Iowa corn i s (figure 5.1) has less variability than that of 
Georgia cotton (figure 5.2). This suggests that Iowa CRD 10 is a more homogeneous 
production region for corn, and Georgia CRD 70 is a more heterogeneous production 
region for cotton. Similarly, i s for Ohio CRD 10 corn and soybeans are less variable 
than i s for other production regions like Mississippi CRD 40 cotton and soybeans, and 
Kansas CRD 30 wheat. 
Significance tests of i s are presented in table 5.1 for Iowa CRD 10 corn and 
Georgia CRD 70 cotton. In the table, the first three columns contain the name of the state, 
CRD, and crop, the fourth column contains the number of farms in that CRD, the fifth 
column contains the three null hypotheses for each crop, and the last column indicates the 
percentage of farms in that CRD that failed to reject the null hypotheses at 5% 
significance level. For Iowa CRD 10 corn, 91.68% of farms failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that i equals one, and only 28.97% of farms failed to reject the null 
hypotheses that i equals zero. For Georgia CRD 70 cotton, 78.80% of farms failed to 
reject i equals one, 67.28% of farms failed to reject i equals zero, and 47.47% of farms 
failed to reject i equals one and i equals zero. This shows that the majority of farm 
yields in Iowa CRD 10 corn have a very close relationship with county yield. This is less 
so in Georgia CRD 70 cotton. The close relationship between farm yield and county yield 
in Iowa CRD 10 suggests that Iowa CRD 10 is a homogeneous production region for 
corn, while this is less so in Georgia CRD 70 cotton. These results are consistent with the 
findings from figures 5.1 and 5.2. Additionally, 47.47% and 25.89% of farms failed to 
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reject either i equals one and i equals zero for Georgia CRD 10 cotton and Iowa CRD 
10 corn, respectively. This reflects the lack of statistical power when only ten farm yield 
observations are available with which to estimate i . 
Table 5.2 shows that the mean of farm beta, county beta, and the products of farm 
beta and county beta. The farm beta is the way to measure the relationship between farm 
yield and county yield, the county beta is the way to measure the relationship between the 
county yield and CRD yield, and then the products of the two is the way to measure the 
relationship between the farm yield and CRD yield. From this table, it can be seen that 
the most of farm beta is around one which is also confirmed by Miranda 1991. The 
relationship between the farm yield and CRD yield is related with the farm yield and 
county yield. If the farm yield has a close relationship with county yield, then it tends to 
have a more close relationship with CRD yield. 
Simulation results are presented in tables 5.3-5.34 under two different risk 
aversion coefficient levels ( 2   and 3  ) for GRP and GRIP, respectively. In each 
table the first column contains the name of the county, the second column contains the 
number of farms that were simulated in that county, and the third through seventh 
columns are the ratios of the certainty equivalent from the specified insurance scenario to 
the certainty equivalent under a no insurance scenario. Specifically, the third through the 
seventh columns are the ratio of the insurance certainty equivalent to the no insurance 
certainty equivalent for CRD-level GRP/GRIP with scale equal to 1.50, CRD-level 
GRP/GRIP with scale equal to 1.00, county-level GRP/GRIP with scale equal to 1.50, 
and county-level GRP/GRIP with scale equal to 1.00, respectively. For example, 1.03418 
in the third column in table 5.4 means that the certainty equivalent of buying CRD-level 
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insurance with scale 1.5 is 3.418% more than the certainty equivalent of not buying any 
insurance for corn in Buena Vista county, Iowa CRD 10 for an individual with a CRRA 
utility function with a risk aversion coefficient of two. 
Figures 5.9-5.16 are the histograms of the ratio of certainty equivalent under 
GRIP for different insurance scenarios with scale 1.5 at 90% coverage level divided by 
certainty equivalent with no insurance for different crops and locations. From these eight 
figures, the histograms are much wider for Georgia CRD 70 than for Iowa CRD 10 for 
each insurance scenario. This is not surprising if we go back to look at the histograms of 
i for Iowa CRD 10 and Georgia CRD 70 from figures 5.1 and 5.2. In figure 5.1 and 5.2, 
they shows that the histograms of i  are much wider for Georgia CRD 70 than for Iowa 
CRD 10. The distributions of i  affect the certainty equivalent outcomes of each 
insurance scenario. Figures 5.9-5.16 again reinforce the previous point that Georgia CRD 
70 cotton is a more heterogeneous production region than Iowa CRD 10 corn. 
All the conclusions are similar between GRP and GRIP, the only difference is that 
the certainty equivalent results (tables 5.3-5.34) for GRIP are little higher than certainty 
equivalent results for GRP. This is because GRIP protects against both price risk and 
yield risk, but GRP only protects against yield risk. The remainder of this discussion is 
focused only on GRP. 
For almost all the states, any of the actuarially-fair GRP insurance scenarios 
generate higher certainty equivalents than a no insurance scenario. For Georgia CRD 70 
(tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10) this is not always the case. Some of the certainty 
equivalents under the assumed insurance scenarios are lower than with no insurance. This 
is because Georgia CRD 70 is a more heterogeneous region as discussed above. In some 
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cases the relationship between farm yield and county yield is so weak ( i s are negative) 
that buying area-level insurance will actually increase the risk. 
In table 5.35, we can see that for all the CRDs and crops analyzed, county-level 
GRP generates higher certainty equivalents for the majority farms compared to CRD-
level GRP under the same scale level. For example, in Iowa CRD 10 corn 72.50% of 
farms would prefer county level insurance with scale 1.5 and 75.23% of farms would 
prefer county level insurance with scale 1.0. 
Although the county level insurance is preferred to CRD level insurance for most 
farms, the magnitude of the difference is relatively small for Iowa CRD 10 corn 
compared to Georgia CRD 70 cotton. This is because Iowa is a much more homogeneous 
production region than Georgia. For example, for Buena Vista county in table 5.4, the 
ratio of certainty equivalent for buying county-level insurance with scale of 1.5 divided 
by no insurance is 1.03901, and the ratio of certainty equivalent for buying CRD-level 
insurance with scale of 1.5 divided by no insurance is 1.03418. The difference between 
these two insurance scenarios is 0.00483 for Buena Vista county in Iowa CRD 10, which 
means that the certainty equivalent of buying county-level insurance with scale 1.5 is 
only 0.483% higher than the certainty equivalent of buying CRD-level insurance in 
Buena Vista county, Iowa CRD 10 for corn with the risk aversion coefficient 3.0. But in 
table 5.8, the difference between certainty equivalent of county-level insurance with scale 
1.5 (1.03929) and certainty equivalent of CRD-level insurance with scale 1.5 (1.01340) is 
0.02589 for Decatur county in Georgia CRD 70 cotton, which means that the certainty 
equivalent of buying county-level insurance with scale 1.5 is 2.585 percent than the 
certainty equivalent of buying CRD-level insurance in Decatur county for cotton with the 
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risk aversion coefficient 3.0. Likewise, the difference of certainty equivalent across 
different insurance scenarios is less in Ohio than in Mississippi, and Kansas. 
Therefore, we can conclude that for more homogeneous regions, any of the 
actuarially-fair GRP insurance scenarios generate higher certainty equivalents than a no 
insurance scenario, and county-level GRP generally generates higher certainty 
equivalents than CRD-level GRP both for soybeans and corn for Iowa CRD 10— though 
the magnitude of the difference is relatively small. For heterogeneous regions actuarially 
fair insurance scenarios generally, but not always, generate higher certainty equivalent 
than a no insurance scenarios. County-level GRP is generally preferred to CRD-level 
GRP and the magnitude of the difference is generally larger than for more homogeneous 
regions. 
5.1.2 Compare the Effectiveness of CRD-Level/County-Level GRP/GRIP under 
Different Scales 
Based on table 5.4, for the majority of farms for Iowa CRD 10 corn the higher 
level of scale generated higher certainty equivalents than the lower level of scale. But for 
farms in Georgia CRD 70 cotton, the lower level of scale generated higher certainty 
equivalents than the higher level of scale. This result is not surprising since Georgia CRD 
70 cotton has more low  than Iowa CRD 10 corn (figures 5.1 and 5.2). Miranda (1991), 
Black, Barnett, and Hu (1999), and Mahul (1999) all demonstrate that the optimal scale 
for a county-level GRP insurance product is directly related to i . By extension the 
optimal scale for a CRD-level GRP insurance product would be directly related to the 
product of i and c . Mississippi CRD 40 soybeans and cotton, Kansas CRD 30 wheat 
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have similar results to Georgia CRD 70 cotton. Ohio CRD 10 soybeans and corn have a 
similar result as Iowa CRD 10 corn and soybeans. 
5.1.3 Compare the Effectiveness of CRD-Level/County-Level GRP/GRIP under 
Different Risk Aversion Coefficients 
The higher the risk aversion coefficient, the more risk averse the individual is 
assumed to be. So a higher risk aversion coefficient generates higher certainty 
equivalents under alternative insurance scenarios for both GRP and GRIP. This is the 
case for almost all the states and crops in this study, indicated on the certainty equivalent 
results tables (tables 5.3-5.34). For Georgia CRD 70 cotton this is not the case, some of 
the certainty equivalent results are lower when the risk aversion coefficient equals to 3. 
This result likely reflects the fact that for 67.28% of farms we cannot reject the null 
hypotheses that i  equals to 0. This indicates that for some farms, yield is not closely 
related with county-yield in Georgia CRD 70, thus, buying area-based insurance will not 
lower the risk, but it may increase the risk. Therefore, a more risk averse individual will 
not choose to buy area-based insurance given this situation. 
5.2 Shallow Loss Program and Revenue Protection 
For the shallow loss program, coverage was assumed to be 90% and scale was 
1.00. The maximum shallow loss payment occurs when revenue falls below 75% if the 
expected level. Coverage was assumed to be equal to 85% of Revenue Protection. For 
each scenario, it was further assumed that 2  and 3  . 
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5.2.1 Shallow Loss Program and Revenue Protection Results 
Simulation results are presented in tables 5.37-5.52 for the shallow loss program 
and Revenue Protection. In each table the first column contains the name of the county, 
the second column contains the number of farms that were simulated in that county (the 
number of farms for which at least ten years of yield data were available), the last column 
contains the ratios of certainty equivalent for Revenue Protection relative to no insurance 
and no government commodity programs, and the third column includes the ratios of the 
certainty equivalent between the combination of Revenue Protection and the shallow loss 
program and just Revenue Protection. For Buena Vista county, in table 5.37 Revenue 
Protection increases certainty equivalent by 2% relative to no insurance and no 
commodity programs. The shallow loss program and Revenue Protection combined 
increases the certainty equivalent by another 5% relative to just Revenue Protection. 
Because the Revenue Protection alone can only protect against the idiosyncratic risk, it 
will also protect against systematic risk including shallow loss program. 
Tables 5.37-5.52 show that in general the ratios of certainty equivalent are greater 
when the risk aversion coefficient equals to three rather than two. This is especially true 
for Revenue Protection in more heterogeneous production regions such as, Kansas, 
Georgia, and Mississippi. For example, consider Georgia CRD 70 cotton in tables 5.39 
and 5.40. For Decatur county, Revenue Protection increases the certainty equivalent by 
5.4 percent relative to no insurance and no commodity programs when the risk aversion 
coefficient is two. Revenue Protection increases the certainty equivalent by 9.0 percent 
relative to no insurance and no commodity programs when the risk aversion coefficient is 
three. Apart from the magnitude of the certainty equivalent, the two risk aversion 
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coefficients generate similar conclusions. Therefore, the remainder of this discussion 
focuses only on examples where the risk aversion coefficient is 2.0. 
In Mississippi CRD 40 for both cotton and soybeans (table 5.47 and 5.49), Kansas 
CRD 30 (table 5.51), and Georgia CRD 70 (table 5.39), the ratios of the certainty 
equivalent of Revenue Protection over the certainty equivalent of no insurance and no 
commodity programs are much more greater than that in Iowa CRD 10 for both corn and 
soybeans (table 5.37 and 5.41) and Ohio CRD 10 for both corn and soybeans (tables 5.43 
and 5.45). This finding is also shown in the histograms of the ratio of certainty equivalent 
for Revenue Protection versus no insurance and no commodity programs for different 
crops and locations (figures 5.17-5.24). For example, in Iowa CRD 10 (figure 5.17 and 
5.19) and Ohio CRD 10 (figure 5.20 and 5.21), it is very obvious that the distribution is 
skewed to the left, and all the ratios are centered on 1.0-1.1.This is not the case for 
Mississippi CRD 40 (figures 5.23 and 5.24), Kansas CRD 30 (figure 5.22), and Georgia 
CRD 70 (figure 5.18). These findings are reasonable, because Iowa and Ohio have less 
yield risk. Therefore, purchasing actuarially fair Revenue Protection has much more risk 
reduction impacts in Kansas, Mississippi, and Georgia than it does in Iowa and Ohio. 
Tables 5.37-5.52 show that the magnitude of how much the shallow loss program 
increases certainty equivalents relative to just Revenue Protection is similar across all the 
locations and crops we analyzed. This point is also shown in the histograms of the 
marginal effect of the shallow loss program for all the simulated farms in the CRD 
(figures 5.25-5.32). From figures 5.25-5.32, we can see that all the distributions have the 
similar shape and the ratios are concentrated on 1.02-1.07 which means that adding the 
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shallow loss program to Revenue Protection increased certainty equivalent by 2% - 7% 
relative to just having Revenue Protection. 
5.2.2 Compare the Marginal Effects of Shallow Loss Program to Revenue 
Protection within Each Location and Crop 
In Iowa CRD 10 for both corn and soybeans (tables 5.37 and 5.41) and Ohio CRD 
10 for corn and soybeans (tables 5.43 and 5.45), the marginal certainty equivalent effects 
of the shallow loss is greater than the marginal effect of Revenue Protection. While, in 
Kansas CRD 30 for wheat (table 5.51), Georgia CRD 70 for cotton (table 5.39), and 
Mississippi CRD 40 for both cotton and soybeans (tables 5.47 and 5.49) that is not the 
case, the marginal effects of Revenue Protection are greater than the marginal effects of 
the shallow loss program.  This is because the yield risk is comparably low in the 
Midwest (Iowa and Ohio). Therefore, for the locations that have less yield risk like the 
Midwest, the marginal effects of the shallow loss program are higher than those of the 
Revenue Protection program. 
5.3 Deep Loss Program and Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 
A deep loss program would have the government takes care of deep loss though 
area level revenue insurance and producers take care of shallow losses by purchasing 
Revenue Protection which wraps around the deep loss program. The deep loss program 
was assumed to have coverage equal to 70% and scale equal to 1.00. Coverage was 
assumed to be equal to 85% for the wrapped Revenue Protection product. For the wrap-
around crop insurance policy any indemnity paid would be reduced by the amount the 
producer received from the deep loss program. For each scenario, it was further assumed 
that risk aversion coefficients are equal to 2.0 and 3.0. The shallow loss and deep loss 
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marginal equivalent effects cannot be compared to each other, because the expected 
payments are not equal. Instead the coverage levels are based on current policy debates. 
5.3.1 Deep Loss Program and Wrapped Revenue Protection 
Simulation results are presented in tables 5.53-5.68 for Iowa CRD 10 corn, 
Georgia CRD 70 cotton, Iowa CRD 10 soybeans, Ohio CRD 10 corn, Ohio CRD 10 
soybean, Kansas CRD 30 wheat, Mississippi CRD 40 cotton, and Mississippi CRD 40 
soybeans under two different risk aversion coefficient levels ( 2   and 3  ) for deep 
loss program and actuarially fair wrapped Revenue Protection insurance, respectively. In 
each table the first column contains the name of the county, the second column contains 
the number of farms that were simulated in that county (the number of farms for which at 
least 10 years of yield data were available), the third column includes the ratios of the 
certainty equivalent of the deep loss program to no government program which shows the 
marginal effect of deep loss program, and the last column contains the ratios of certainty 
equivalent between the combined deep loss and Revenue Protection insurance and just 
the deep loss insurance program which shows the marginal effect of the wrapped  
Revenue Protection insurance. For example, 1.01191 the first number of the third column 
in the table 5.53 means that the certainty equivalent of deep loss program is 1.191% 
greater than the certainty equivalent with no government program for Buena Vista 
county, Iowa CRD 10 for corn with the risk aversion coefficient 2.0. 
Tables 5.37-5.52 show that in general the certainty equivalent is greater when the 
risk aversion coefficient equals to 3.0. Apart from the magnitude, the two risk aversion 
coefficient share the same conclusions. Therefore, the discussions focus only on the risk 
aversion coefficient of 2.0. 
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From tables 5.53-5.68, we can see that all the ratios are greater than 1 which 
means that the deep loss program is preferred to no government program, and also the 
actuarially fair wrapped insurance product is preferred to just having the deep loss 
program. 
5.3.2 The Deep Loss Program and Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 
Perform Differently Across Different Locations and Crops 
In Mississippi CRD 40 for both soybeans and cotton (table 5.65 and 5.63), Kansas 
CRD 30 (table 5.67), and Georgia CRD 70 (table 5.55), the ratio of the certainty 
equivalents of the deep loss program over no program are much greater than in Iowa 
CRD 10 for both soybeans and corn (table 5.53 and 5.57) and Ohio CRD 10 for both 
soybeans and corn (tables 5.59 and 5.61). This is also shown in the histograms of the 
ratios of certainty equivalent for deep loss program versus no government program for 
different crops and locations (figures 5.33-5.40). For example, in Iowa CRD 10 (figure 
5.33 and 5.35) and Ohio CRD 10 (figure 5.36 and 5.37), it is very obvious that the 
distribution is skewed to the left, and all the ratios are centered on 1.0-1.05, while this is 
not the case for Mississippi CRD 40 (figures 5.39 and 5.40), Kansas CRD 30 (figure 
5.38), and Georgia CRD 70 (figure 5.34). In these locations, the distributions are widely 
spread compared to Iowa and Ohio.  Again, this result likely reflects the lower yield risk 
in the Midwest. Similarly, the certainty equivalent of the combination deep loss program 
and wrapped Revenue Protection insurance is greater in heterogeneous regions like 
Georgia, Kansas, and Mississippi than in more homogeneous regions like Iowa and Ohio. 
And also, from the histograms (figures 5.41-5.48), we can see that the distributions of 
Kansas, Georgia, and Mississippi are much wider than distributions of Iowa and Ohio. 
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Table 5.1 Estimation of i  
State  CRD Crop Number of farms 
0H  Failed to reject 
Iowa 10 Corn 5454 
i =0 28.97% 
    
i =1 91.68% 
    
i =0 and i =1 25.89% 
Georgia 70 Cotton 217 
i =0 67.28% 
    
i =1 78.80% 
    
i =0 and i =1 47.47% 



















































































































































































































Table 5.3 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 










Buena Vista 499 1.01848 1.01631 1.02085 1.01835 
Cherokee 488 1.01648 1.01502 1.01780 1.01531 
Clay 415 1.02639 1.02271 1.03002 1.02645 
Dickinson 263 1.03818 1.03269 1.05124 1.04545 
Emmet 308 1.02932 1.02525 1.04110 1.03658 
Lyon 534 1.01639 1.01482 1.01962 1.01878 
O Brien 484 1.02026 1.01764 1.02144 1.01805 
Osceola 326 1.02070 1.01812 1.02528 1.02291 
Palo Alto 406 1.01913 1.01690 1.02372 1.02091 
Pocahontas 620 1.02213 1.01940 1.02955 1.02637 
Sioux 567 1.01359 1.01239 1.01694 1.01546 
 
Table 5.4 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 










Buena Vista 499 1.03418 1.03140 1.03901 1.03509 
Cherokee 488 1.03123 1.02841 1.03313 1.02924 
Clay 415 1.05146 1.04560 1.05743 1.05189 
Dickinson 263 1.06844 1.06072 1.08650 1.07930 
Emmet 308 1.05573 1.04961 1.07359 1.06756 
Lyon 534 1.02992 1.02759 1.03518 1.03405 
O Brien 484 1.03854 1.03446 1.04086 1.03551 
Osceola 326 1.03964 1.03556 1.04710 1.04352 
Palo Alto 406 1.03753 1.03394 1.04528 1.04095 
Pocahontas 620 1.04273 1.03844 1.05534 1.05054 






Table 5.5 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 










Buena Vista 499 1.02541 1.02277 1.02803 1.02527 
Cherokee 488 1.02400 1.02166 1.02538 1.02263 
Clay 415 1.02957 1.02630 1.03308 1.02974 
Dickinson 263 1.03203 1.02982 1.04559 1.04207 
Emmet 308 1.03078 1.02772 1.04216 1.03860 
Lyon 534 1.02333 1.02133 1.02598 1.02436 
O Brien 484 1.02642 1.02338 1.02788 1.02454 
Osceola 326 1.02641 1.02363 1.03086 1.02812 
Palo Alto 406 1.02514 1.02262 1.03018 1.02715 
Pocahontas 620 1.02670 1.02419 1.03489 1.03129 
Sioux 567 1.02225 1.02007 1.02634 1.02403 
 
Table 5.6 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 










Buena Vista 499 1.04198 1.03861 1.04675 1.04310 
Cherokee 488 1.03863 1.03590 1.04103 1.03765 
Clay 415 1.05060 1.04625 1.05689 1.05245 
Dickinson 263 1.04842 1.04720 1.07220 1.06864 
Emmet 308 1.05002 1.04682 1.07034 1.06615 
Lyon 534 1.03700 1.03484 1.04211 1.04041 
O Brien 484 1.04377 1.03995 1.04576 1.04160 
Osceola 326 1.04399 1.04048 1.05209 1.04855 
Palo Alto 406 1.04197 1.03891 1.05091 1.04700 
Pocahontas 620 1.04408 1.04135 1.05944 1.05471 







Table 5.7 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 










Decatur 24 1.00724 1.00860 1.02078 1.02390 
Early 24 1.01690 1.02065 1.03194 1.03918 
Grady 30 1.00711 1.01160 1.06267 1.06130 
Miller 20 0.98161 0.99311 1.00607 1.01259 
Mitchell 41 1.02194 1.02211 1.03040 1.03411 
Seminole 16 1.00203 1.00530 1.02141 1.02224 
Sumter 13 0.98083 0.99300 0.92851 0.96491 
Terrell 16 0.98491 0.99726 0.98141 1.00355 
Thomas 33 1.00326 1.00749 1.01258 1.01922 
 
Table 5.8 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 3.0 










Decatur 24 1.01340 1.01606 1.03929 1.04407 
Early 24 1.02520 1.03306 1.05081 1.06270 
Grady 30 1.00769 1.01809 1.10479 1.10556 
Miller 20 0.97112 0.98788 1.01251 1.02165 
Mitchell 41 1.03729 1.03890 1.05023 1.05726 
Seminole 16 1.00243 1.00899 1.03892 1.04125 
Sumter 13 0.97476 0.99161 0.90472 0.95228 
Terrell 16 0.97437 0.99294 0.97781 1.00762 









Table 5.9 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 










Decatur 24 1.03570 1.03517 1.04999 1.05190 
Early 24 1.02709 1.03939 1.04237 1.05722 
Grady 30 1.02489 1.03454 1.08606 1.08583 
Miller 20 0.98847 1.00797 1.01833 1.03137 
Mitchell 41 1.04296 1.04589 1.05184 1.05734 
Seminole 16 1.02833 1.03111 1.05069 1.04980 
Sumter 13 0.98789 1.00929 0.93948 0.98159 
Terrell 16 0.98612 1.01005 0.99335 1.02152 
Thomas 33 1.02849 1.03513 1.03959 1.04726 
 
Table 5.10 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 3.0 










Decatur 24 1.05263 1.05548 1.08122 1.08642 
Early 24 1.01980 1.04540 1.04893 1.07562 
Grady 30 1.01244 1.03846 1.12739 1.13372 
Miller 20 0.97217 1.00187 1.02149 1.04091 
Mitchell 41 1.05513 1.06515 1.07160 1.08448 
Seminole 16 1.03511 1.04494 1.07884 1.08113 
Sumter 13 0.97295 1.00605 0.90856 0.96787 
Terrell 16 0.95939 0.99780 0.98215 1.02333 









Table 5.11 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 











Buena Vista 394 1.00818 1.00691 1.01044 1.00912 
Cherokee 373 1.00272 1.00266 1.00338 1.00287 
Clay 341 1.00857 1.00729 1.01160 1.01036 
Dickinson 210 1.01283 1.01078 1.01933 1.01710 
Emmet 228 1.00793 1.00685 1.01288 1.01244 
Lyon 382 1.00756 1.00635 1.00907 1.00792 
O Brien 379 1.00435 1.00384 1.00629 1.00547 
Osceola 270 1.00754 1.00636 1.01120 1.01003 
Palo Alto 302 1.00813 1.00704 1.01295 1.01164 
Plymouth 499 1.00020 1.00091 1.00321 1.00282 
Pocahontas 417 1.00636 1.00552 1.00805 1.00717 
Sioux 386 1.00334 1.00308 1.00338 1.00279 
 
Table 5.12 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 










Buena Vista 394 1.01535 1.01236 1.01912 1.01701 
Cherokee 373 1.00469 1.00461 1.00593 1.00512 
Clay 341 1.01664 1.01462 1.02252 1.02504 
Dickinson 210 1.02565 1.02231 1.03701 1.03361 
Emmet 228 1.01538 1.01362 1.02417 1.02347 
Lyon 382 1.01428 1.01227 1.01684 1.01497 
O Brien 379 1.00807 1.00724 1.01168 1.01035 
Osceola 270 1.01434 1.01239 1.02066 1.01879 
Palo Alto 302 1.01548 1.01377 1.02427 1.02230 
Plymouth 499 1.00042 1.00158 1.00574 1.00513 
Pocahontas 417 1.01176 1.01039 1.01459 1.01320 






Table 5.13 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 










Buena Vista 394 1.02706 1.02441 1.02939 1.02676 
Cherokee 373 1.02196 1.01982 1.02374 1.02141 
Clay 341 1.02621 1.02411 1.02905 1.02674 
Dickinson 210 1.02850 1.02667 1.03518 1.03236 
Emmet 228 1.02592 1.02409 1.03103 1.02929 
Lyon 382 1.02630 1.02336 1.02761 1.02481 
O Brien 379 1.02328 1.02065 1.02906 1.02317 
Osceola 270 1.02676 1.02383 1.03035 1.02730 
Palo Alto 302 1.02577 1.02421 1.03112 1.02886 
Plymouth 499 1.01836 1.01776 1.02371 1.02175 
Pocahontas 417 1.02531 1.02307 1.02690 1.02454 
Sioux 386 1.02236 1.01987 1.02344 1.02092 
 
Table 5.14 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 










Buena Vista 394 1.04356 1.04027 1.04765 1.04435 
Cherokee 373 1.03385 1.03141 1.03668 1.03399 
Clay 341 1.04022 1.03868 1.04618 1.04408 
Dickinson 210 1.04335 1.04259 1.05658 1.05389 
Emmet 228 1.04031 1.03887 1.05010 1.04855 
Lyon 382 1.04202 1.03832 1.04430 1.04082 
O Brien 379 1.03608 1.03300 1.04123 1.03761 
Osceola 270 1.04289 1.03928 1.04935 1.04551 
Palo Alto 302 1.03948 1.03877 1.04973 1.04769 
Plymouth 499 1.02667 1.02716 1.03583 1.03417 
Pocahontas 417 1.03999 1.03739 1.04273 1.03993 






Table 5.15 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 










Allen 56 1.02911 1.02583 1.03817 1.03462 
Defiance 47 1.00419 1.00570 1.00763 1.00839 
Fulton 36 1.00819 1.00824 1.00890 1.00800 
Hancock 152 1.02515 1.02231 1.03018 1.02898 
Henry 58 1.01099 1.01020 1.01088 1.00944 
Paulding 36 1.01328 1.01352 1.01565 1.01600 
Putnam 70 1.02309 1.02033 1.02591 1.02434 
Van Wert 66 1.00851 1.00930 1.01089 1.01123 
Williams 35 1.01210 1.01167 1.01167 1.01138 
Wood 132 1.01648 1.01490 1.01747 1.01658 
 
Table 5.16 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 










Allen 56 1.06047 1.05530 1.07694 1.07152 
Defiance 47 1.00880 1.01127 1.01523 1.01647 
Fulton 36 1.01526 1.01533 1.01625 1.01486 
Hancock 152 1.05234 1.04781 1.06112 1.05942 
Henry 58 1.02138 1.01997 1.02116 1.01872 
Paulding 36 1.02724 1.02798 1.03167 1.03261 
Putnam 70 1.04616 1.04179 1.05083 1.04850 
Van Wert 66 1.01732 1.01865 1.02159 1.02226 
Williams 35 1.02233 1.02171 1.02143 1.02106 








Table 5.17 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 










Allen 56 1.02690 1.02524 1.03725 1.03450 
Defiance 47 1.01458 1.01474 1.01755 1.01724 
Fulton 36 1.01735 1.01596 1.01905 1.01710 
Hancock 152 1.02573 1.02358 1.03133 1.02991 
Henry 58 1.01920 1.01703 1.01990 1.01752 
Paulding 36 1.01820 1.01862 1.02086 1.02117 
Putnam 70 1.02431 1.02203 1.02756 1.02573 
Van Wert 66 1.01643 1.01655 1.02017 1.01991 
Williams 35 1.01939 1.01819 1.01856 1.01756 
Wood 132 1.02114 1.01919 1.02226 1.02070 
 
Table 5.18 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 










Allen 56 1.04602 1.04527 1.06638 1.06351 
Defiance 47 1.02187 1.02340 1.02743 1.02811 
Fulton 36 1.02716 1.02573 1.02951 1.02727 
Hancock 152 1.04474 1.04258 1.05615 1.05510 
Henry 58 1.03194 1.02889 1.03230 1.02909 
Paulding 36 1.02738 1.03016 1.03246 1.03502 
Putnam 70 1.04035 1.03802 1.04727 1.04542 
Van Wert 66 1.02479 1.02655 1.03162 1.03266 
Williams 35 1.03071 1.02971 1.02925 1.02859 








Table 5.19 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 










Allen 59 1.01666 1.01452 1.01924 1.01664 
Defiance 86 1.02239 1.01984 1.03151 1.02815 
Hancock 204 1.01617 1.01413 1.02201 1.02067 
Henry 77 1.00881 1.00805 1.01013 1.00931 
Paulding 102 1.02567 1.00260 1.03081 1.02841 
Putnam 130 1.01794 1.01590 1.02138 1.01870 
Van Wert 109 1.00751 1.00712 1.00872 1.00771 
Williams 45 1.00735 1.00750 1.01099 1.01030 
Wood 191 1.01600 1.01419 1.01860 1.01804 
 
Table 5.20 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 










Allen 59 1.03294 1.02954 1.03766 1.03355 
Defiance 86 1.04423 1.04047 1.06038 1.05553 
Hancock 204 1.03176 1.02854 1.04185 1.03999 
Henry 77 1.01608 1.01485 1.01817 1.01692 
Paulding 102 1.05096 1.04638 1.05956 1.05638 
Putnam 130 1.03409 1.03110 1.04047 1.03647 
Van Wert 109 1.01426 1.01372 1.01645 1.01488 
Williams 45 1.01360 1.01404 1.02053 1.01956 









Table 5.21 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 










Allen 59 1.02697 1.02513 1.02952 1.02757 
Defiance 86 1.02760 1.02773 1.03805 1.03578 
Hancock 204 1.02689 1.02515 1.03279 1.03138 
Henry 77 1.02271 1.02085 1.02452 1.02287 
Paulding 102 1.02783 1.02857 1.03414 1.03421 
Putnam 130 1.02592 1.02527 1.02971 1.02828 
Van Wert 109 1.02196 1.02030 1.02401 1.02221 
Williams 45 1.02026 1.02055 1.02467 1.02349 
Wood 191 1.02574 1.02461 1.02867 1.02845 
 
Table 5.22 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 










Allen 59 1.04384 1.04248 1.04789 1.04649 
Defiance 86 1.04076 1.04414 1.06205 1.06083 
Hancock 204 1.04276 1.04189 1.05422 1.05368 
Henry 77 1.03576 1.03379 1.03865 1.03704 
Paulding 102 1.04021 1.04505 1.05387 1.05701 
Putnam 130 1.03906 1.04025 1.04592 1.04587 
Van Wert 109 1.03416 1.03283 1.03739 1.03592 
Williams 45 1.02971 1.03216 1.03812 1.03796 









Table 5.23 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 










Clark 82 1.03328 1.04266 1.05179 1.05795 
Finney 297 1.03941 1.04535 1.04110 1.04806 
Ford 345 1.04477 1.04991 1.05801 1.06290 
Gray 219 1.05950 1.06020 1.05500 1.05985 
Hamilton 212 1.02021 1.03713 1.02116 1.04327 
Haskell 153 1.01896 1.03090 1.03200 1.04642 
Hodgeman 248 1.02851 1.03850 1.05027 1.05728 
Kearny 207 1.02484 1.03835 1.02601 1.03714 
Meade 125 1.06900 1.07040 1.05733 1.06602 
Morton 110 1.02177 1.03668 1.04724 1.06494 
Seward 98 1.03638 1.04364 1.03990 1.05528 
Stanton 157 1.04081 1.04886 1.04845 1.06228 
 
Table 5.24 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 3.0 










Clark 82 1.04697 1.06414 1.07556 1.08818 
Finney 297 1.05710 1.06908 1.06081 1.07376 
Ford 345 1.07047 1.08140 1.09325 1.10306 
Gray 219 1.09124 1.09598 1.08442 1.09458 
Hamilton 212 1.02002 1.04452 1.02056 1.05081 
Haskell 153 1.01706 1.03619 1.03663 1.05763 
Hodgeman 248 1.04184 1.06002 1.07960 1.09245 
Kearny 207 1.03327 1.05536 1.03435 1.05345 
Meade 125 1.09762 1.10444 1.07809 1.09452 
Morton 110 1.02366 1.04611 1.05680 1.08162 
Seward 98 1.04903 1.06173 1.05326 1.07531 






Table 5.25 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 










Clark 82 1.03751 1.05087 1.05974 1.06706 
Finney 297 1.04484 1.05349 1.04484 1.05555 
Ford 345 1.05133 1.05913 1.06603 1.07281 
Gray 219 1.06549 1.06857 1.05975 1.06807 
Hamilton 212 1.01803 1.04143 1.02423 1.04952 
Haskell 153 1.02397 1.03909 1.03428 1.05395 
Hodgeman 248 1.03433 1.04767 1.05862 1.06772 
Kearny 207 1.02754 1.04591 1.02901 1.04525 
Meade 125 1.07145 1.07682 1.06036 1.07233 
Morton 110 1.02183 1.04213 1.05223 1.07214 
Seward 98 1.04044 1.05100 1.04516 1.06259 
Stanton 157 1.04397 1.05598 1.05308 1.06996 
 
Table 5.26 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 3.0 










Clark 82 1.04005 1.06611 1.07720 1.09414 
Finney 297 1.05357 1.07218 1.05482 1.07558 
Ford 345 1.06858 1.08644 1.09420 1.10950 
Gray 219 1.08894 1.09983 1.07896 1.09721 
Hamilton 212 1.00328 1.03877 1.01469 1.05101 
Haskell 153 1.01256 1.03826 1.02685 1.05695 
Hodgeman 248 1.03830 1.06458 1.08179 1.10019 
Kearny 207 1.02490 1.05659 1.02595 1.05516 
Meade 125 1.08702 1.10265 1.07012 1.09419 
Morton 110 1.00946 1.04178 1.05353 1.08335 
Seward 98 1.04258 1.06257 1.05083 1.07787 






Table 5.27 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 










Humphreys 13 1.03146 1.02888 1.03043 1.02900 
Leflore 32 1.01453 1.01416 1.01476 1.01562 
Skarkey 16 1.01586 1.01551 1.02857 1.02640 
Washington 13 1.02576 1.02339 1.03178 1.02892 
Yazoo 15 1.01363 1.01394 1.02353 1.02097 
 
Table 5.28 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 3.0 










Humphreys 13 1.05590 1.05335 1.05366 1.05303 
Leflore 32 1.02754 1.02712 1.02798 1.02953 
Skarkey 16 1.03224 1.03222 1.05760 1.05433 
Washington 13 1.05166 1.04849 1.06311 1.05913 













Table 5.29 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 










Humphreys 13 1.04738 1.04700 1.04566 1.04674 
Leflore 32 1.04171 1.03932 1.04150 1.04044 
Skarkey 16 1.04117 1.03926 1.05463 1.05200 
Washington 13 1.04954 1.04648 1.05600 1.05269 
Yazoo 15 1.03959 1.03886 1.05115 1.04736 
 
Table 5.30 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 3.0 










Humphreys 13 1.06484 1.07011 1.06172 1.06921 
Leflore 32 1.06630 1.06500 1.06919 1.06698 
Skarkey 16 1.06285 1.06430 1.08942 1.08887 
Washington 13 1.07750 1.07768 1.09030 1.08962 













Table 5.31 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Mississippi Soybean CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 










Humphreys 17 1.01551 1.01901 1.01840 1.02643 
Issaquena 19 1.02456 1.02501 1.03874 1.04110 
Leflore 31 1.01199 1.01523 1.01039 1.01344 
Skarkey 23 1.02015 1.02146 1.02250 1.02719 
Sunflower 53 1.01308 1.01504 1.01009 1.01331 
Washington 52 1.01569 1.01692 1.01577 1.01653 
 
Table 5.32 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Mississippi Soybean CRD 40, CRRA 3.0 










Humphreys 17 1.02674 1.03463 1.03357 1.04821 
Issaquena 19 1.04164 1.04567 1.06829 1.07553 
Leflore 31 1.02032 1.02674 1.01744 1.02352 
Skarkey 23 1.03375 1.03781 1.03722 1.04689 
Sunflower 53 1.02235 1.02655 1.01605 1.02244 












Table 5.33 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Mississippi Soybean CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 










Humphreys 17 1.02728 1.03482 1.03212 1.04221 
Issaquena 19 1.03919 1.04233 1.05493 1.05922 
Leflore 31 1.02371 1.02949 1.02220 1.02775 
Skarkey 23 1.03489 1.03864 1.03744 1.04424 
Sunflower 53 1.02701 1.03018 1.02471 1.02865 
Washington 52 1.03002 1.03225 1.03017 1.03239 
 
Table 5.34 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Alternative GRIP Insurance Scenarios at 
90% coverage level, Mississippi Soybean CRD 40, CRRA 3.0 










Humphreys 17 1.02952 1.04898 1.04311 1.06489 
Issaquena 19 1.04980 1.06349 1.08226 1.09683 
Leflore 31 1.02828 1.04163 1.02504 1.03809 
Skarkey 23 1.04592 1.05797 1.05135 1.06778 
Sunflower 53 1.03477 1.04381 1.03009 1.04051 












Table 5.35 Percentage of Farms with Specific Results for GRP 
  cy1.5 > crd1.5 cy1.0 > crd1.0 cy1.5>cy1.0 crd1.5>crd1.0
IA Corn 72.50% 75.23% 67.00% 70.54% 
IA Soybean 79.63% 82.74% 73.24% 67.67% 
OH Soybean 75.37% 80.76% 70.49% 75.07% 
OH Corn 74.42% 79.80% 62.94% 67.59% 
MS Cotton 69.66% 73.03% 55.06% 53.93% 
MS Soybean 60.00% 60.51% 32.31% 37.44% 
KS Wheat 59.48% 64.49% 31.07% 35.82% 
GA Cotton 67.74% 74.65% 32.72% 14.75% 
 
Table 5.36 Percentage of Farms with Specific Results for GRIP 
  cy1.5 > crd1.5 cy1.0 > crd1.0 cy1.5>cy1.0 crd1.5>crd1.0
IA Corn 72.09% 77.03% 80.67% 82.86% 
IA Soybean 78.96% 84.91% 92.09% 90.94% 
OH Soybean 74.78% 79.86% 76.77% 77.47% 
OH Corn 73.69% 79.22% 79.22% 84.59% 
MS Cotton 66.29% 73.03% 66.29% 75.28% 
MS Soybean 57.95% 60.51% 40.51% 40.00% 
KS Wheat 58.28% 64.40% 27.87% 27.34% 











Table 5.37 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 




Buena Vista 499 1.04995 1.01969 
Cherokee 488 1.04593 1.02134 
Clay 415 1.05069 1.02770 
Dickinson 263 1.05114 1.06348 
Emmet 308 1.05249 1.04482 
Lyon 534 1.04717 1.02452 
O Brien 484 1.04616 1.02582 
Osceola 326 1.05028 1.02439 
Palo Alto 406 1.04917 1.02481 
Pocahontas 620 1.05094 1.02823 
Sioux 567 1.05022 1.01829 
 
Table 5.38 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 




Buena Vista 499 1.05584 1.03639 
Cherokee 488 1.05103 1.03822 
Clay 415 1.05566 1.05062 
Dickinson 263 1.04966 1.08619 
Emmet 308 1.05482 1.06883 
Lyon 534 1.05113 1.03976 
O Brien 484 1.05092 1.04621 
Osceola 326 1.05532 1.04304 
Palo Alto 406 1.05395 1.04485 
Pocahontas 620 1.05612 1.05195 






Table 5.39 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 




Decatur 24 1.06983 1.05419 
Early 24 1.07363 1.12050 
Grady 30 1.07148 1.11524 
Miller 20 1.06656 1.11361 
Mitchell 41 1.06700 1.09729 
Seminole 16 1.06316 1.06488 
Sumter 13 1.06880 1.08534 
Terrell 16 1.06876 1.13698 
Thomas 33 1.07539 1.06132 
 
Table 5.40 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 3.0 




Decatur 24 1.07529 1.08976 
Early 24 1.05964 1.16631 
Grady 30 1.06357 1.17870 
Miller 20 1.05570 1.14294 
Mitchell 41 1.06183 1.13836 
Seminole 16 1.06590 1.11218 
Sumter 13 1.05807 1.12094 
Terrell 16 1.05216 1.16534 








Table 5.41 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 




Buena Vista 394 1.05317 1.01908 
Cherokee 373 1.04863 1.01570 
Clay 341 1.05144 1.02628 
Dickinson 210 1.05392 1.03636 
Emmet 228 1.05562 1.02479 
Lyon 382 1.04983 1.01953 
O Brien 379 1.04814 1.01736 
Osceola 270 1.05098 1.02003 
Palo Alto 302 1.05374 1.02775 
Plymouth 499 1.04993 1.02146 
Pocahontas 417 1.05190 1.01789 
Sioux 386 1.04685 1.01595 
 
Table 5.42 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 




Buena Vista 394 1.06008 1.03447 
Cherokee 373 1.05491 1.02785 
Clay 341 1.05713 1.04857 
Dickinson 210 1.05799 1.06157 
Emmet 228 1.06191 1.04475 
Lyon 382 1.05621 1.03482 
O Brien 379 1.05439 1.03116 
Osceola 270 1.05765 1.03662 
Palo Alto 302 1.05966 1.05028 
Plymouth 499 1.05582 1.03830 
Pocahontas 417 1.05851 1.03184 





Table 5.43 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 




Allen 56 1.05253 1.04109 
Defiance 47 1.04502 1.02451 
Fulton 36 1.04412 1.01501 
Hancock 152 1.05157 1.03185 
Henry 58 1.04252 1.01300 
Paulding 36 1.04918 1.03916 
Putnam 70 1.04810 1.02878 
Van Wert 66 1.05032 1.02555 
Williams 35 1.04450 1.01712 
Wood 132 1.04613 1.02183 
 
Table 5.44 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 




Allen 56 1.05549 1.07892 
Defiance 47 1.04925 1.04548 
Fulton 36 1.04930 1.02737 
Hancock 152 1.05608 1.06317 
Henry 58 1.04785 1.02416 
Paulding 36 1.05207 1.07383 
Putnam 70 1.05203 1.05427 
Van Wert 66 1.05490 1.04803 
Williams 35 1.04915 1.03143 







Table 5.45 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 




Allen 59 1.05181 1.03597 
Defiance 86 1.05451 1.05427 
Hancock 204 1.05622 1.03469 
Henry 77 1.05088 1.02284 
Paulding 102 1.05675 1.05921 
Putnam 130 1.05166 1.04496 
Van Wert 109 1.04932 1.02434 
Williams 45 1.05108 1.03000 
Wood 191 1.05501 1.03888 
 
Table 5.46 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Ohio Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 




Allen 59 1.05613 1.06548 
Defiance 86 1.05580 1.09368 
Hancock 204 1.06194 1.06466 
Henry 77 1.05657 1.03975 
Paulding 102 1.05694 1.10403 
Putnam 130 1.05400 1.07609 
Van Wert 109 1.05483 1.04433 
Williams 45 1.05608 1.05483 








Table 5.47 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 




Humphreys 13 1.06300 1.08402 
Leflore 32 1.06429 1.03831 
Skarkey 16 1.06799 1.05421 
Washington 13 1.06496 1.06491 
Yazoo 15 1.06533 1.04652 
 
Table 5.48 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 3.0 




Humphreys 13 1.05994 1.13916 
Leflore 32 1.07114 1.06965 
Skarkey 16 1.07234 1.10022 
Washington 13 1.06839 1.12001 













Table 5.49 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Mississippi Soybeans CRD 40, CRRA 
2.0 




Humphreys 17 1.06549 1.09864 
Issaquena 19 1.07227 1.08947 
Leflore 31 1.05589 1.08070 
Skarkey 23 1.06849 1.07641 
Sunflower 53 1.05513 1.06657 
Washington 52 1.05524 1.06740 
 
Table 5.50 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Mississippi Soybeans CRD 40, CRRA 
3.0 




Humphreys 17 1.06018 1.16110 
Issaquena 19 1.07158 1.16114 
Leflore 31 1.05230 1.12020 
Skarkey 23 1.06735 1.12685 
Sunflower 53 1.05346 1.10277 









Table 5.51 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 




Clark 82 1.05553 1.13846 
Finney 297 1.05880 1.14187 
Ford 345 1.06397 1.13122 
Gray 219 1.06175 1.13485 
Hamilton 212 1.05570 1.19483 
Haskell 153 1.05515 1.18268 
Hodgeman 248 1.06435 1.13341 
Kearny 207 1.05907 1.16052 
Meade 125 1.06011 1.15439 
Morton 110 1.05840 1.17853 
Seward 98 1.06142 1.13715 
Stanton 157 1.06074 1.16338 
 
Table 5.52 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Revenue Protection and Shallow 
Loss Protection, and Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No 
Government Insurance respectively, Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 3.0 




Clark 82 1.03872 1.19308 
Finney 297 1.04192 1.18454 
Ford 345 1.04960 1.18928 
Gray 219 1.04554 1.18809 
Hamilton 212 1.02794 1.20511 
Haskell 153 1.02889 1.18873 
Hodgeman 248 1.04913 1.19037 
Kearny 207 1.04001 1.20026 
Meade 125 1.04015 1.20089 
Morton 110 1.02957 1.19891 
Seward 98 1.03800 1.16965 





Table 5.53 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, Iowa 
Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 




Buena Vista 499 1.01191 1.02270 
Cherokee 488 1.00975 1.02570 
Clay 415 1.01514 1.02873 
Dickinson 263 1.02447 1.05817 
Emmet 308 1.02310 1.04080 
Lyon 534 1.01642 1.02560 
O Brien 484 1.00973 1.03031 
Osceola 326 1.01633 1.02492 
Palo Alto 406 1.01366 1.02680 
Pocahontas 620 1.01844 1.02800 
Sioux 567 1.01207 1.02134 
 
Table 5.54 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, Iowa 
Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 




Buena Vista 499 1.01872 1.03743 
Cherokee 488 1.01498 1.04205 
Clay 415 1.02547 1.04564 
Dickinson 263 1.03948 1.06608 
Emmet 308 1.03850 1.05185 
Lyon 534 1.02429 1.03690 
O Brien 484 1.01573 1.04930 
Osceola 326 1.02617 1.03800 
Palo Alto 406 1.02241 1.04238 
Pocahontas 620 1.02982 1.04490 






Table 5.55 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 




Decatur 24 1.06257 1.03602 
Early 24 1.07914 1.08585 
Grady 30 1.09477 1.06968 
Miller 20 1.04946 1.09986 
Mitchell 41 1.07085 1.06956 
Seminole 16 1.05263 1.05063 
Sumter 13 1.06590 1.07812 
Terrell 16 1.07500 1.10967 
Thomas 33 1.06492 1.04485 
 
Table 5.56 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 3.0 




Decatur 24 1.08923 1.05059 
Early 24 1.10052 1.10211 
Grady 30 1.13582 1.08628 
Miller 20 1.06100 1.11295 
Mitchell 41 1.09563 1.08336 
Seminole 16 1.07716 1.07691 
Sumter 13 1.06783 1.10525 
Terrell 16 1.08346 1.11867 







Table 5.57 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, Iowa 
Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 




Buena Vista 394 1.01394 1.02198 
Cherokee 373 1.00939 1.02075 
Clay 341 1.01489 1.02908 
Dickinson 210 1.01824 1.03698 
Emmet 228 1.01924 1.02558 
Lyon 382 1.01259 1.02312 
O Brien 379 1.01097 1.02155 
Osceola 270 1.01568 1.02186 
Palo Alto 302 1.01662 1.02962 
Plymouth 499 1.00969 1.02750 
Pocahontas 417 1.01299 1.02121 
Sioux 386 1.00869 1.02126 
 
Table 5.58 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, Iowa 
Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 




Buena Vista 394 1.02077 1.03609 
Cherokee 373 1.01324 1.03431 
Clay 341 1.02244 1.01905 
Dickinson 210 1.02839 1.05597 
Emmet 228 1.02841 1.04163 
Lyon 382 1.01869 1.03766 
O Brien 379 1.01591 1.03561 
Osceola 270 1.02357 1.03589 
Palo Alto 302 1.02515 1.04875 
Plymouth 499 1.01363 1.04611 
Pocahontas 417 1.01888 1.03452 





Table 5.59 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, Ohio 
Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 




Allen 56 1.01852 1.04067 
Defiance 47 1.01040 1.03052 
Fulton 36 1.00607 1.02122 
Hancock 152 1.01900 1.03158 
Henry 58 1.00585 1.01895 
Paulding 36 1.01193 1.04442 
Putnam 70 1.01438 1.03093 
Van Wert 66 1.00937 1.03162 
Williams 35 1.00924 1.02213 
Wood 132 1.01046 1.02604 
 
Table 5.60 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, Ohio 
Corn CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 




Allen 56 1.03377 1.06731 
Defiance 47 1.01526 1.05227 
Fulton 36 1.00876 1.03579 
Hancock 152 1.03308 1.05362 
Henry 58 1.00875 1.03212 
Paulding 36 1.01907 1.07684 
Putnam 70 1.02367 1.05153 
Van Wert 66 1.01394 1.05498 
Williams 35 1.01327 1.03734 







Table 5.61 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, Ohio 
Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 




Allen 59 1.01401 1.03966 
Defiance 86 1.02109 1.05389 
Hancock 204 1.01999 1.03574 
Henry 77 1.01151 1.02782 
Paulding 102 1.02158 1.05918 
Putnam 130 1.01409 1.04894 
Van Wert 109 1.01024 1.03012 
Williams 45 1.01263 1.03505 
Wood 191 1.01874 1.04085 
 
Table 5.62 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, Ohio 
Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 3.0 




Allen 59 1.02226 1.06597 
Defiance 86 1.03400 1.08349 
Hancock 204 1.03123 1.06014 
Henry 77 1.01661 1.04516 
Paulding 102 1.03441 1.09418 
Putnam 130 1.02187 1.07643 
Van Wert 109 1.01501 1.05104 
Williams 45 1.01859 1.05961 








Table 5.63 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 




Humphreys 13 1.04376 1.07253 
Leflore 32 1.03887 1.03210 
Skarkey 16 1.04339 1.04306 
Washington 13 1.04355 1.05387 
Yazoo 15 1.03709 1.03956 
 
Table 5.64 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 3.0 




Humphreys 13 1.06333 1.10829 
Leflore 32 1.05617 1.05227 
Skarkey 16 1.06766 1.06873 
Washington 13 1.06854 1.08752 












Table 5.65 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Mississippi Soybeans CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 




Humphreys 17 1.06049 1.07976 
Issaquena 19 1.06485 1.06689 
Leflore 31 1.02991 1.07813 
Skarkey 23 1.05207 1.06261 
Sunflower 53 1.03268 1.06302 
Washington 52 1.02941 1.06431 
 
Table 5.66 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Mississippi Soybeans CRD 40, CRRA 3.0 




Humphreys 17 1.08517 1.11459 
Issaquena 19 1.09869 1.10507 
Leflore 31 1.04033 1.10731 
Skarkey 23 1.07309 1.09340 
Sunflower 53 1.04375 1.08919 











Table 5.67 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 2.0 




Clark 82 1.09027 1.09454 
Finney 297 1.06938 1.10919 
Ford 345 1.08792 1.08784 
Gray 219 1.08030 1.09508 
Hamilton 212 1.10177 1.13881 
Haskell 153 1.08052 1.13704 
Hodgeman 248 1.08606 1.09201 
Kearny 207 1.06669 1.13111 
Meade 125 1.09743 1.10307 
Morton 110 1.12047 1.11017 
Seward 98 1.10163 1.08759 
Stanton 157 1.10531 1.10485 
 
Table 5.68 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection and Wrapped 
Revenue Protection Insurance, Divided by No government Insurance, 
Kansas Wheat CRD 30, CRRA 3.0 




Clark 82 1.11486 1.10846 
Finney 297 1.09049 1.11925 
Ford 345 1.12016 1.10235 
Gray 219 1.10809 1.10869 
Hamilton 212 1.10447 1.12054 
Haskell 153 1.08776 1.11801 
Hodgeman 248 1.11616 1.10721 
Kearny 207 1.08203 1.14202 
Meade 125 1.11973 1.10973 
Morton 110 1.12545 1.09706 
Seward 98 1.11341 1.08718 





Figure 5.1 Corn i ’s Iowa CRD 10 
 
 




Figure 5.3 Soybeans i ’s Iowa CRD 10 
 
 




Figure 5.5 Soybeans i ’s Ohio CRD 10 
 
 




Figure 5.7 Cotton i ’s Mississippi CRD 40 
 
 




Figure 5.9 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP CRD-level Insurance with Scale 
1.5 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with no 
insurance, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP CRD-level Insurance with Scale 
1.0 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with no 




Figure 5.11 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP County-level Insurance with Scale 
1.5 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with no 
insurance, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP County-level Insurance with Scale 
1.0 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with no 




Figure 5.13 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP CRD-level Insurance with Scale 
1.5 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with no 
insurance, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP CRD-level Insurance with Scale 
1.0 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with no 




Figure 5.15 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP County-level Insurance with Scale 
1.5 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with no 
insurance, Georgia Cotton CRD 70, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.16 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for GRIP County-level Insurance with Scale 
1.0 at 90% coverage level, divided by Certainty Equivalents with no 




Figure 5.17 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No Insurance 
in Shallow Loss Program, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.18 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No Insurance 




Figure 5.19 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No Insurance 
in Shallow Loss Program, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.20 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No Insurance 




Figure 5.21 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No Insurance 
in Shallow Loss Program, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.22 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No Insurance 




Figure 5.23 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No Insurance 
in Shallow Loss Program, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.24 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Revenue Protection versus No Insurance 




Figure 5.25 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss Program, 
Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.26 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss Program, 




Figure 5.27 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss Program, 
Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.28 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss Program, 




Figure 5.29 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss Program, 
Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.30 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss Program, 




Figure 5.31 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss Program, 
Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0  
 
 
Figure 5.32 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Both Shallow Losses Protection and 
Revenue Protection versus Revenue Protection in Shallow Loss Program, 




Figure 5.33 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Iowa Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.34 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 




Figure 5.35 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Iowa Soybeans CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.36 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 




Figure 5.37 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents Deep Loss Protection versus No Insurance 
in Deep Loss Program, Ohio Corn CRD 10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.38 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents Deep Loss Protection versus No Insurance 





Figure 5.39 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 
Insurance in Deep Loss Program, Mississippi Cotton CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.40 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Deep Loss Protection versus No 





Figure 5.41 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 




Figure 5.42 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 
versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Georgia Cotton CRD 





Figure 5.43 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 
versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Iowa Soybeans CRD 
10, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.44 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 
versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Ohio Soybeans CRD 




Figure 5.45 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 




Figure 5.46 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 
versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Kansas Wheat CRD 




Figure 5.47 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 
versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Mississippi Cotton 
CRD 40, CRRA 2.0 
 
 
Figure 5.48 Ratio of Certainty Equivalents for Wrapped Revenue Protection Insurance 
versus Deep Loss Protection in Deep Loss Program, Mississippi Soybeans 





This study built on Miranda’s (1991) CAPM model by using the PQH 
multivariate simulation method to generate simulated correlated price and yield to 
analyze three different area-based products: county- and CRD level-GRP/GRIP, county-
level shallow loss program, and county-level deep loss program. 
The results presented here confirm earlier findings that GRP/GRIP generally 
performs better in homogeneous regions than in heterogeneous production regions (such 
as Georgia CRD 70, Mississippi CRD 40, and Kansas CRD 30). The lower the variability 
of the i s distribution, the more homogeneous that production region is, otherwise the 
higher the variability of the i s distribution, the more heterogeneous that production 
region is.  For more homogeneous regions (such as Ohio CRD 10 and Iowa CRD 10), any 
of the actuarially-fair GRP insurance scenarios generate higher certainty equivalents than 
a no insurance scenario, and county-level GRP generally generates higher certainty 
equivalents than CRD-level GRP both for soybeans and corn for Iowa CRD 10— though 
the magnitude of the difference is relatively small. For heterogeneous regions actuarially 
fair insurance scenarios generally, but not always, generate higher certainty equivalent 
than a no insurance scenarios. County-level GRP is generally preferred to CRD-level 
GRP and the magnitude of the difference is generally larger than for more homogeneous 
 
114 
regions. Also, a higher risk aversion coefficient generates higher certainty equivalents 
under alternative insurance scenarios for both GRP and GRIP for homogeneous regions, 
but for heterogeneous regions that is not always the case. Therefore, it can concluded that 
CRD-level GRP in general does not always perform well in heterogeneous production 
regions, therefore the CRD-level GRP may not be a viable alternative for GRP in 
heterogeneous production regions. 
Shallow loss program tends to have a greater impact on heterogeneous production 
regions. For the shallow loss program, it was found that Revenue Protection is preferred 
to no insurance. Also a combination of Revenue Protection and shallow loss protection is 
preferred to just having Revenue Protection. Second, it was found that the marginal effect 
of Revenue Protection is greater in heterogeneous production regions than it does in 
homogeneous production regions and also the marginal effect of Revenue Protection is 
greater than marginal effect of shallow loss protection in heterogeneous production 
regions than in homogeneous production regions. These findings are reasonable, because 
Iowa and Ohio have less yield risk. Therefore, purchasing Revenue Protection insurance 
products has much more risk reduction impacts in Kansas, Mississippi, and Georgia than 
it does in Iowa and Ohio. Third, we also found that magnitude of how much the shallow 
loss increases certainty equivalents relative to just Revenue Protection is similar across 
all the locations and crops we analyzed. At last, we found that the ratios of certainty 
equivalent are greater when the risk aversion coefficient equals to three rather than two. 
That is especially true for Revenue Protection in more heterogeneous production regions 
such as, Kansas, Georgia, and Mississippi. 
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The Deep loss program tends to have a greater impact on higher yield risk 
production regions. For the deep loss program, first it was found that the deep loss 
program is preferred to no government program, and also the wrapped insurance product 
is preferred to just having the deep loss program.  Second it was found that the marginal 
effect of wrapped Revenue Protection insurance is greater in heterogeneous regions like 
Georgia, Kansas, and Mississippi than in more homogeneous regions like Iowa and Ohio 
and also the marginal effect of deep loss protection is also perform better in more 
heterogeneous production regions. These findings are reasonable, because Iowa and Ohio 
have less yield risk. At last, it was found that the ratios of certainty equivalent are greater 
when the risk aversion coefficient equals to three rather than two, especially true for more 
heterogeneous production regions such as, Kansas, Georgia, and Mississippi. 
Future extensions of this work could analyze more crops and regions and examine 
the sensitivity of results to assumptions regarding initial wealth and the level of relative 
risk aversion. Further work may also solve for optimal levels of scale and coverage rather 
than using assumed values. Because coverage is based on current policy debates, 
payments do not equalize across these two programs. Therefore, the shallow loss program 
and the deep loss program cannot be compared in this study. In order to compare these 
two programs from a risk management perspective, the payments from these two 
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